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THE TROUBLE WITH TINKER: AN
EXAMINATION OF STUDENT FREE SPEECH
RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL AGE
Allison N. Sweeney*
ABSTRACT
The boundaries of the schoolyard were once clearly delineated
by the physical grounds of the school. In those days, it was
relatively easy to determine what sort of student behavior fell
within an educator’s purview, and what lay beyond the school’s
control. Technological developments have all but erased these
confines and extended the boundaries of the school environment
somewhat infinitely, as the internet and social media allow
students to interact seemingly everywhere and at all times. As
these physical boundaries of the schoolyard have disappeared, so
too has the certainty with which an educator might supervise a
student’s behavior.
Because smartphones, tablets, and computers abound, the ways
in which students are able to communicate have changed
dramatically in the new millennium, but the law governing the free
speech rights of students in American public schools has not kept
pace. Current law allows educators to punish student speakers
when their in-school speech disrupts the school environment, or is
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likely to do so—but it is not clear that this same standard should
apply to student speech that is posted online away from school, or
whether a school should be able to punish off-campus online
student speech at all. Because the Supreme Court of the United
States has not yet spoken on the issue, and in the absence of a
better standard, the courts that have addressed the issue of
problematic off-campus online student speech have applied this
standard that bases a school’s ability to punish the speaker on the
(potential) disruptiveness of his or her speech.
This Note explores that which the First Amendment guarantees
to adult citizens and the ways in which these guarantees differ for
public school students in school, as governed by four major
Supreme Court decisions in the past fifty years. This Note then
examines the recent cases in which courts have applied this
precedent to off-campus online student speech for which the
speakers were punished by their schools, and analyzes the ways in
which the application of the same standard in these cases has led
to drastically different outcomes. Ultimately, this Note contends
that educators must be able to supervise student online activities to
some extent, and proposes a new standard by which a public
school would be able to punish a student for his or her off-campus
online speech only if that speech was actually of concern to the
school, and if that speech interfered with the rights of others in the
school community.
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INTRODUCTION
The advent of the internet and its associated technologies has
changed American life in countless ways. It has entirely reshaped
how we interact and communicate, which is evident perhaps
nowhere more clearly than in American high schools. The internet
is a tool, but as with any such helpful device, problems arise when
it is mishandled. As parents and educators attempt to teach
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children responsible ways to relate to the world around them, they
are navigating the uncharted waters of the digital age, which can be
particularly tricky in a society that so values its freedom of speech.
The internet has changed the teenage social landscape, and adults
are still learning to recognize when it is necessary to intervene, and
how best to do so.
A recent tragedy highlights many of the facets of the debate
over whether schools should be able to regulate student speech that
is posted online away from campus. On February 14, 2018,
Nikolas Cruz entered his former high school in Parkland,
Florida1—from which he had been expelled2—and fired more than
one hundred bullets from his semiautomatic rifle3 in six minutes.4
He is accused of murdering seventeen students and employees of
Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in that time.5 Only adding
to the terrible circumstances of these horrific events is that
someone with the username ‘Nikolas Cruz’ had posted an eerie
message in the comments of a YouTube6 video only five months
earlier: “I’m going to be a professional school shooter.”7 Though
1

Patricia Mazzei & Alan Blinder, Parkland 911 Calls Are Released: ‘Someone’s
TIMES
(Mar.
8,
2018),
Shooting
Up
the
School,’
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/08/us/florida-school-shooting-911-calls.html
[https://perma.cc/LYU7-RVAD].
2
Brianna Sacks, This Is What We Know About Nikolas Cruz, The Florida High
School
Shooting
Suspect,
BUZZFEED
(Feb.
16,
2018,
4:44
PM),
https://www.buzzfeed.com/briannasacks/florida-school-shootingsuspect?utm_term=.xkZYG0KlyD#.obNyaOBrN4 [https://perma.cc/4GQP-KHKM].
3
Audra D.S. Burch, Frances Robles & Patricia Mazzei, Florida Agency Investigated
Nikolas Cruz After Violent Social Media Posts, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/17/us/nikolas-cruz-florida-shooting.html
[https://perma.cc/5WFR-KSMM].
4
Mazzei & Blinder, supra note 1.
5
Id.
6
YouTube is a video site where one “goes to watch user-generated videos.” Diana
Graber & Cynthia Lieberman, A CyberWise Guide to 10 Apps Teens Love, CYBERWISE,
http://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/f6bccd_69e0700c50ee46f4ae6747069e2270d1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5ESX-KB46] (last visited Nov. 6, 2018). YouTube “is now the second
largest search engine after Google (who also owns it). Min[imum] age of use [is] 18.
Those from 13-17 must have a parent or guardian’s permission to sign up.” Id.
7
Therese Apel, ‘Nikolas Cruz’ YouTube Comment Brings FBI to Bail Bondsman’s
Door, USA TODAY (Feb. 15, 2018, 1:35 PM), https://www.usatoday.com
/story/news/nation-now/2018/02/15/florida-school-shooting-nikolas-cruz-youtubecomment-bail-bondsman/341236002/ [https://perma.cc/BAC4-MPHD].
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the owner of the video reported this to the Federal Bureau of
Investigations at the time, there was little evidence for detectives to
use in their investigation, as “there was no particular information
about the particular time, location, or further identifiers about the
person who posted the comment.”8 Assuming this comment was in
fact posted by the same Nikolas Cruz indicted for the murders in
Parkland,9 his high school likely could have acted on such speech
had the school known about it while he was still a student there,
despite the fact that he posted it online away from campus.10
At present, off-campus online student speech is generally
punishable if it is reasonably forecast to cause or actually does
cause a substantial disruption of the school environment.11 Though
courts do not necessarily agree about what sort of speech is
foreseeably or actually disruptive on the whole,12 threatening
speech is generally considered disruptive, and therefore
punishable.13 Not all violent speech is necessarily threatening, but
if a school became aware of this same post from one of its
students, it seems reasonable to interpret the post as a threat
directed towards the speaker’s classmates, and subsequently, it
would be reasonable to punish the speaker. Notwithstanding a

8

Adam Goldman & Patricia Mazzei, YouTube Comment Seen as Early Warning in
Shooting Left Little for F.B.I. to Investigate, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/15/us/politics/nikolas-cruz-youtube-comment-fbi.html
[https://perma.cc/692Q-C44S].
9
Alan Blinder, Florida Will Seek Execution of Nikolas Cruz in Parkland Shooting
Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/13/us/nikolascruz-death-penalty.html [https://perma.cc/6J6P-UAXM].
10
See generally infra Section II.C.1.a (discussing standards governing school
punishment of violent/threatening off-campus online student speech).
11
Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 390–91 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied,
136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016); see also infra Part II (discussing the current standard governing
off-campus online student speech). This Note analyzes the First Amendment rights of
American public school students only, as the rights of private school students, or students
in public universities are not necessarily the same as those of public school students. Any
discussion of “schools,” “school officials,” or “students” in this Note refers to public
schools, their students, and faculty unless otherwise noted.
12
See generally infra Part II.
13
This is true of threatening speech in general, as well as threatening speech analyzed
under the Tinker standard in a school setting. See infra Section II.C.1.a (discussing
standards governing school punishment of violent/threatening off-campus online student
speech).
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general right to free speech in the United States, this is exactly the
sort of speech that a school must be able to regulate, not only to
maintain order in its classrooms, but also to protect its students
from imminent danger.14
Had the school identified and acted on this comment, seventeen
lives might have been saved. Unfortunately, this tragedy was not
prevented and many of the young survivors have since become
staunch advocates for stricter gun control.15 Imagine a student who
survived a school shooting such as this posting to her Facebook
page from home a month after the carnage, encouraging her
classmates to walk out of class in organized protest to advocate for
gun control reform. Inciting her classmates to act in this way is
likely foreseeably disruptive of the school environment,16 and
therefore likely subjects the speaker to punishment at school. Ours
is a society in which a post expressing the speaker’s desire to
orchestrate a “professional” school shooting17 is punishable on the
same level as a post advocating for peaceful protest and political
change. It is unfathomable that a student attempting to peacefully
change a world with which she disagrees faces the same risk of
school discipline as another student threatening to murder his
classmates. Though a school must have some ability to maintain
order in its halls, students, too, must have some right to speak,18 for
as student participants in the Civil Rights Movement, Vietnam War
14

See infra Section III.A.
See Maggie Astor, ‘Let Us Have a Childhood’: On the Road with the Parkland
Activists,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
15,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/15/us/politics/parkland-students-voting.html
[https://perma.cc/SXV3-9KG7]; Julie Turkewitz & Vivian Yee, With Grief and Hope,
Florida Students Take Gun Control Fight on the Road, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/20/us/parkland-students-shootingflorida.html?module=inline [https://perma.cc/JZH4-YFEY].
16
See infra Section II.C.1.b (discussing off-campus online student speech that harasses
others, especially Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2008), in which a
student’s blog post encouraged her classmates to call the “douchebags in the central
office” to “piss [them] off”); see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 434–35 (2007)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (indicating that the attempt to persuade other students to action is
an important consideration. “It is a gross non sequitur to draw from these two
unremarkable propositions the remarkable conclusion that the school may suppress
student speech that was never meant to persuade anyone to do anything.”).
17
Goldman & Mazzei, supra note 8.
18
See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
15
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protests, and more recently, March For Our Lives, have proven, the
youth always has something to say.19 As George Washington once
noted, should “the freedom of Speech [] be taken away . . . dumb,
and silent we may be led, like sheep, to the Slaughter.”20 This idea
is particularly poignant, and all the more salient, when applied to
the speech of young gun-control advocates who survived a school
shooting and are attempting to peacefully effect change in their
society.
The standard governing school punishment of off-campus
online speech cannot be based solely on whether the speech is
likely to disrupt or actually does disrupt the school environment,
because this standard is too inconsistently applied, and does not
account for the realities of our interconnected modern world.21
Rather, in deciding whether a school can constitutionally punish a
student’s social media post, there are many factors a court must
consider.22
Prior to the advent of the internet, a school’s ability to punish a
student’s speech rested on the context in which the student spoke,
because speech made in the context of the school environment or
school activities was a matter of school concern.23 Generally
speaking, this meant that student speech outside of the school
context was beyond the school’s punitive reach.24 However, the
19

See Charlotte Alter, The School Shooting Generation Has Had Enough, TIME (Mar.
22, 2018), http://time.com/longform/never-again-movement/ [https://perma.cc/3QW5SKRA]; Maggie Astor, 7 Times in History When Students Turned to Activism, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/us/student-protestmovements.html [https://perma.cc/5WUH-ESHU]; Erin Blakemore, Youth in Revolt:
Five Powerful Movements Fueled by Young Activists, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Mar. 23,
2018), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2018/03/youth-activism-young-protestershistoric-movements/ [https://perma.cc/52J4-AYC4].
20
Jacob Lindenbaum, National Gazette, GEORGE WASHINGTON’S MOUNT VERNON,
http://www.mountvernon.org/digital-encyclopedia/article/national-gazette/
[https://perma.cc/KW59-XRNC] (last visited Nov. 6, 2018).
21
See generally infra Section II.C (discussing case law concerning schools punishing
students for off-campus online posts).
22
See generally infra Section II.C (discussing case law concerning schools punishing
students for off-campus online posts).
23
See generally infra Sections II.B.1–II.B.4 (discussing student school speech First
Amendment case law, including Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse).
24
See generally infra Sections II.B.1–II.B.4 (discussing student school speech First
Amendment case law, including Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse).
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internet allows students to reach each other at all times with
unprecedented ease,25 and consequently, the lines designating
speech as made in a school context have become increasingly less
clear.26 Though a student might post something online from home,
his peers might read that post at school. On the other hand, his
peers might read something he posts at school when they get home.
Because of the prevalence of mobile phones, tablets, and
computers,27 and the resulting ease with which students can reach
each other seemingly anytime or anywhere, the location of the
speaker is less indicative than ever of the speech’s relation to the
school.
As the speaker’s location is in many instances no longer any
help in determining whether the student speech is a matter of
school concern, a school may look to the character of the speaker’s
intended audience.28 Depending on the content of the post, a post
that is entirely public may necessitate more school involvement
than a post whose audience is limited to the speaker’s close friends
or family.29 It is unlikely that not a single member of the school
community would see a student’s post, as surely many of his
“friends”30 online are his classmates. Reaching an audience of
25
See Jon Henley, Teenagers and Technology: ‘I’d Rather Give Up My Kidney Than
GUARDIAN
(July
16,
2010,
3:00
PM),
My
Phone,’
THE
https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2010/jul/16/teenagers-mobiles-facebooksocial-networking [https://perma.cc/NND8-ULFJ].
26
See J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 864 (Sup. Ct. Pa.
2002) (noting that “the advent of the Internet has complicated analysis of restrictions of
speech”); see also infra Sections II.B.1–II.B.4 (discussing student speech First
Amendment case law, including Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse); see also infra
Section II.C (discussing student off-campus online speech First Amendment case law).
27
Amanda Lenhart, Teens, Social Media & Technology Overview 2015: A Majority of
American Teens Report Access to a Computer, Game Console, Smartphone and a Tablet,
PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/09/amajority-of-american-teens-report-access-to-a-computer-game-console-smartphone-anda-tablet/ [https://perma.cc/FJ9M-26G9].
28
See infra Section II.C.3 (discussing case law concerning the privacy or publicity of
students’ off-campus online posts and the schools’ ability to punish those posts).
29
See infra Section II.C.3 (discussing case law concerning the privacy or publicity of
students’ off-campus online posts and the schools’ ability to punish those posts).
30
When two people are “friends” with or “followers” of each other on a social media
platform, they can see each other’s posted content and interact with each other’s social
media pages, subject to alterations in standard privacy settings that each user controls for
his own profile. For example, if A is “friends” with B on Facebook, A and B have access
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some kind is arguably the main purpose of posting online at all.
While there is of course generally some public aspect to anything
posted on the internet, the speaker may make efforts to keep his
speech confined to a small audience. Perhaps the speech generates
considerable interaction31 from peers at the speaker’s school, or it
might be that the speech is of no consequence to the school
community at all. The makeup of the audience can help a school
distinguish between these two situations, but is not necessarily
determinative of a school’s ability to get involved.32
A school must therefore also consider what the student’s social
media post actually means when determining its relation to the
school.33 Deciphering student posts is no easy task, as the
significance, or seriousness, of speech on social media is not
always immediately clear. For example, if one student posts about
funeral arrangements for a loved one on Facebook,34 and another
student “likes” that post,35 the student who “liked” the post is
to each other’s content on Facebook, subject to privacy settings either user might set to
restrict the other’s access to his content. See Carolyn Abram, What It Means To Be
Friends on Facebook, DUMMIES, https://www.dummies.com/social-media/facebook
/what-it-means-to-be-friends-on-facebook/ [https://perma.cc/2554-RMR7] (last visited
https://www.facebook.com
Jan.
26,
2019);
Friending,
FACEBOOK,
/help/1540345696275090/?helpref=hc_fnav [https://perma.cc/HQ9T-3FQ7] (last visited
Jan. 26, 2019); see also Follower, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/follower [https://perma.cc/TMD6-RAG6] (last visited Jan. 26,
2019) (defining a “follower” as “one who subscribes to a feed especially on social
media”).
31
Meaning other students comment on, “like,” or similarly “react” to the post. See
generally infra note 35 for further discussion of what it might actually mean to “like” a
post on social media.
32
See infra Section II.C.3 (discussing case law concerning the privacy or publicity of
students’ off-campus online posts and schools’ ability to punish those posts).
33
See infra Sections II.C.1–II.C.2 (discussing the nature and subject of students’ offcampus online posts and schools’ ability to punish those posts).
34
Facebook is a social networking platform “that promotes and facilitates interaction
between
friends,
family,
and
colleagues.”
Facebook,
TECHOPEDIA,
https://www.techopedia.com/definition/4941/facebook [https://perma.cc/BD7Q-8AMA]
(last visited Nov. 6, 2018). Its features include “customized profile, privacy, and security,
friend list management, photo album management, interactive chat, fan pages, classmates
and coworker search engines.” Id.
35
When a user “likes” a social media post, the caption of that post will read, e.g.,
“John Doe likes this.” To “like” a post is to express an interest in some aspect of the post,
or of the post as a whole. There is no way to indicate what a “like” means expressly
unless the user comments to illustrate his thoughts. Some platforms, e.g., Facebook,

368

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXIX:359

probably not indicating that she is excited about the funeral or that
fact that the friend’s loved one has died. Rather, she might be
showing support of the bereaved friend in a difficult time, or she
might be indicating that she will attend the funeral service.
Likewise, if a student posts a photo of a shotgun on Facebook, and
another student “likes” that photo, this interaction does not
necessarily mean the two students are planning an act of violence;
it might be that the two students share a mutual affection for
hunting. The same can be said of the student who posts favorite
song lyrics on social media, and those lyrics happen to be violent.
While it is possible that this post may concern the school, it just as
easily may be the student’s preferred avenue for expressing an
appreciation of a specific artist or sentiment.36 Without further
explanation from the student, a school could not be sure what
exactly his post meant beyond his expressed interest in the song,
particularly because he is not the original author of the lyrics.
These are but a few examples illustrating the possible ambiguity of
communications made through social media, highlighting yet
another challenge schools face in determining whether to punish a
student’s off-campus online speech.
As educators and parents strive to understand and traverse both
the perilous and the positive aspects of a digital social world that
did not exist when they were children, the most glaring question of
all arises: what role should schools play in regulating students’
online behavior? Schools and courts cannot continue to stretch a

allow a user to assign a happy face, sad face, or angry face (each its own emoji, deemed a
“reaction”), to a post as an alternative to the “thumbs up” emoji associated with a “like.”
Other platforms, like Instagram, allow a user only to press a heart icon to express interest,
or to comment on the photo posted.
36
See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 397 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied,
136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016) (deciding a student’s rap video posted to YouTube and Facebook
concerned the school); see also Elonis v. U.S., 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2002 (2015) (examining
the seemingly threatening rap lyrics that a man posted to Facebook, and deciding that it
was error to instruct the jury “that the Government need prove only that a reasonable
person would regard Elonis’s communications as threats . . . [because] [f]ederal criminal
liability generally does not turn solely on the results of an act without considering the
defendant’s mental state.”). Though Elonis involves an adult speaker and not a student,
the analysis illustrates that the meaning of a social media post can be ambiguous.

2019]

THE TROUBLE WITH TINKER

369

fifty-year-old standard37 to fit speech that it was never meant to
encompass. In advocating for an update to the standard, this Note
will investigate this issue in four parts. Part I of this Note will
explore current controversies in the ongoing struggle to balance a
student’s free speech rights regarding speech posted online from
off campus against a public school’s need to maintain order and
civility in its environment. Part II will delve into the current legal
standard governing cases in which a school punished a student for
his off-campus online speech, and examine the different facets of
student posts that courts have considered in determining a school’s
ability to punish its student for said off-campus online speech. Part
III will analyze the costs and benefits of the judiciary’s current
approach as explained in Part II. Finally, Part IV will recommend
an altered legal standard that aims to encompass off-campus online
student speech that is truly of school concern, while protecting that
off-campus online speech that allows students to engage with the
world as they grow, learn, and become contributing members of
society. The proposed standard, when applied, would lead to more
consistent outcomes across courts than the current standard does at
present.
I. THE INTERNET IS HERE TO STAY
Though the internet allows us to communicate with each other
more easily than ever before, that communication is seemingly
endless, for “when we connect to the Internet, we do not enter a
separate space. Networked interactions are embedded in real
life . . . the digital and the physical are enmeshed. We cannot ‘log
out.’”38 The effects of our incessant connectivity are not confined
to the internet as “life online bleeds into life offline and vice
versa.”39 In fact, in the nearly fifty years since it was invented to

37

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); see also infra
Sections II.A–II.B.
38
DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 20 (Harvard Univ. Press
2014).
39
Id.
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aid in military communications,40 the internet has become such an
integral part of American existence that ninety-two percent of
teenagers go online daily.41 Forty-five percent of teenagers are
online “almost constantly,”42 and nearly nine out of ten teens
report accessing the internet multiple times per day.43
The omnipresence of cell phones, and particularly
smartphones, facilitates this hyperconnectivity, ensuring teens are
rarely far away from an internet connection. Ninety-five percent of
teens have access to a smartphone,44 and ninety-one percent of
teens “go online from mobile devices at least occasionally.”45
Given this hyper-ability to connect, it is not surprising that the
average American teen consumes media for nine hours daily,
excluding media consumed for school or homework purposes.46
Their media consumption includes “watching TV, movies, and
online videos; playing video, computer, and mobile games; using
social media; using the Internet; reading; and listening to music.”47
Nearly half of teens “spend their free time [after school] on social

40

Ben Tarnoff, How the Internet Was Invented, THE GUARDIAN (July 15, 2016, 7:00
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jul/15/how-the-internet-wasinvented-1976-arpa-kahn-cerf [https://perma.cc/A5ZQ-SJRV].
41
Amanda Lenhart, Teens, Social Media & Technology Overview 2015, PEW
RESEARCH CENTER (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/09/teens-socialmedia-technology-2015/ [https://perma.cc/P3BL-FY2M]. Teenagers in this report are
defined as those ages 13–17. Id.
42
Monica Anderson & Jingjing Jiang, Teens, Social Media & Technology 2018, PEW
RESEARCH CENTER (May 31, 2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/05/31/teens-socialmedia-technology-2018/ [https://perma.cc/BDU3-Z4HM] (noting that “some 45% of
teens say they use the internet ‘almost constantly,’ a figure that has nearly doubled from
the 24% who said this in the 2014–2015 survey”). Teenagers in this report are defined as
those ages 13–17. Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Lenhart, supra note 41.
46
Vicky Rideout, The Common Sense Census: Media Use by Tweens and Teens,
COMMON SENSE MEDIA, INC. 14–15 (2015), https://www.commonsensemedia.org
/sites/default/files/uploads/research/census_executivesummary.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GM24-FWHG]. “A majority of teens (57 percent) spend more than four
hours per day with screen media. (The non-screen portion of young people’s media use
includes listening to music and reading print.)” Id. at 15.
47
Id. at 15.

2019]

THE TROUBLE WITH TINKER

371

media or texting with friends,”48 and seventy-one percent of teens
frequent more than one social media site.49
Surely excessive internet usage, as excessive use of anything,
can have adverse health effects on the user.50 However, the impact
of internet usage on children and teens is of particular concern, as
they are now developing the habits that they will carry with them
through life.51 While about thirty-one percent of teens believe that
social media and the like have a positive effect on people their age,
about twenty-four percent feel the effect is negative, and another
forty-five percent feel the effect is neither positive nor negative.52
In comparison, nearly two-thirds of teachers find that their
students’ connectivity has improved their ability not only to multitask effectively, but also to locate information quickly and
efficiently.53 One teacher observed that the media available to
students have improved the way students collaborate, noting that
students “communicate with their peers a lot through texting, plan
events and generally are more engaged with the world.”54 Some
teachers have found that “their students’ use of media has
broadened their horizons by exposing them to diverse viewpoints

48

How Teens Spend Their After-School Hours, BARNA GROUP (Aug. 29, 2017),
https://www.barna.com/research/teens-spend-school-hours/
[https://perma.cc/SC7BLPE6]. This statistic is for the 13–17 age group. Id.
49
February 2016: Teens’ Social Media Use: How They Connect & What It Means for
Health, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH,
https://www.hhs.gov/ash/oah/news/e-updates/february-2016-teens-social-mediause/index.html [https://perma.cc/H39F-JKA2] (last visited Nov. 6, 2018).
50
Rosalyn Carson-DeWitt, What Is Internet Addiction?, EVERYDAY HEALTH (Oct. 6,
2015),
https://www.everydayhealth.com/internet-addiction/guide/
[https://perma.cc
/P8Z7-JLW5].
51
See Children and Technology: Creating Healthy Eating and Living Habits,
MAXLIVING (May 4, 2018), https://maxliving.com/healthy-articles/children-andtechnology [https://perma.cc/F6LG-VHAU].
52
Anderson & Jiang, supra note 42.
53
Children, Teens, and Entertainment Media: The View from the Classroom, In Some
Areas, Teachers Are More Likely To Say That Entertainment Media Have Helped Rather
Than Hurt Their Students Academically, COMMON SENSE MEDIA, INC. (Nov. 1, 2012),
https://www.commonsensemedia.org/research/children-teens-and-entertainment-mediathe-view-from-the-classroom/key-finding-4%3A—some-media-helping-to-improveperformance [https://perma.cc/24DD-KQHX].
54
Id.
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and experiences.”55 They feel “social awareness flourishes with
students being aware of worldwide issues through YouTube and
Facebook.”56
Overall, however, teachers feel entertainment media have had
more of a negative than a positive effect on the social development
of their students in general.57 Many teachers believe that “their
students’ use of entertainment media has hurt their academic
performance,”58 citing downticks in students’ attention spans,
writing skills, and quality of homework.59 In addition, teachers
worry about students’ critical thinking skills and ability to
communicate face to face.60 Other areas of social development that
teachers feel are negatively affected in this way include ideas about
gender relations, attitudes towards authority figures like parents
and teachers, sexualization, and an increase in both anti-social and

55
Children, Teens, and Entertainment Media: The View from the Classroom, Some
Teachers See a Positive Effect of Media on Children’s Social Development, COMMON
SENSE MEDIA, INC. (Nov. 1, 2012), https://www.commonsensemedia.org/research
/children-teens-and-entertainment-media-the-view-from-the-classroom/key-finding7%3A-positive-effects-to-social-development [https://perma.cc/B343-HS43].
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Children, Teens, and Entertainment Media: The View from the Classroom, Many
Teachers Think Their Students’ Use of Entertainment Media Has Hurt Their Academic
SENSE
MEDIA,
INC.
(Nov.
1,
2012),
Performance,
COMMON
https://www.commonsensemedia.org/research/children-teens-and-entertainment-mediathe-view-from-the-classroom/key-finding-1%3A-media-use-impacts-academicperformance [https://perma.cc/C6XM-CJ57]. “Entertainment media was defined as the
TV shows, music, video games, texting, iPods, cell phone games, social networking sites,
apps, computer programs, online videos, and websites students use for fun.” Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. Teachers felt that social media was hurting their students’ face-to-face
communication skills in 2012, and at the time, forty-nine percent of teens felt that their
“favorite way to communicate with friends” was in-person (compared to seven percent of
teens who then favored communicating via social media). Id.; Victoria Rideout &
Michael B. Robb, Social Media, Social Life: Teens Reveal Their Experiences, COMMON
SENSE MEDIA, INC. 5 (2018), https://www.commonsensemedia.org/sites/default/files
/uploads/research/2018_cs_socialmediasociallife_fullreport-final-release_2_lowres.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZJ6K-GTH9]. Six years later, only thirty-two percent of teens prefer to
communicate with friends in-person, and sixteen percent now favor communication via
social media. Id.
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aggressive behaviors, such as being mean or acting violently
towards others.61
Though they are often described as “glued” to the devices that
connect them to each other, even teens are not oblivious to the
effects of their constant connectivity. Fifty-four percent of teens
feel that social media “often distracts [them] when [they] should be
paying attention to the people [they are] with,” and forty-two
percent feel that the time they devote to social media has detracted
from the time they “could be spending with friends in person.”62
Additionally, teens occasionally experience frustration with their
friends’ and parents’ attachment to their electronic devices,63 and
nearly forty-five percent wish they could sometimes disconnect
from their digital lives.64 Though it is impossible to separate fully
the digital from the physical world, there is a disconnect between
the two in that almost one third of teenage social media users admit
to flirting with someone online “that they wouldn’t have flirted
with in person,” and similarly confess that “they’ve said something
bad about someone online that they wouldn’t have said in
person.”65 In many ways, the digital world is a social scene with
rules, norms, and etiquette all its own.66 But so, too, is the school
61
Children, Teens, and Entertainment Media: The View from the Classroom, Many
Teachers Think Their Students’ Use of Entertainment Media Has Had a Negative Effect
on Key Aspects of Their Social Development, COMMON SENSE MEDIA, INC. (Nov. 1,
2012), https://www.commonsensemedia.org/research/children-teens-and-entertainmentmedia-the-view-from-the-classroom/key-finding-5%3A-negative-effects-to-socialdevelopment [https://perma.cc/C2EW-4B42].
62
Rideout & Robb, supra note 60, at 5.
63
Social Media, Social Life: How Teens View Their Digital Lives—Some Teens Wish
They Could Disconnect More Often—And That the People Around Them Would, Too,
COMMON SENSE MEDIA, INC. (June 26, 2012),
https://www.commonsensemedia.org/research/social-media-social-life-how-teens-viewtheir-digital-lives/key-finding-4%3A-teens-wish-they-could-disconnect-more-often
[https://perma.cc/A2XX-CBAJ].
64
Id.
65
Social Media, Social Life: How Teens View Their Digital Lives—Most Teens Prefer
Face-to-Face Communication, and Many of Them Think Using Social Media Can
Interfere With That, COMMON SENSE MEDIA, INC. (June 26, 2012),
https://www.commonsensemedia.org/research/social-media-social-life-how-teens-viewtheir-digital-lives/key-finding-3%3A-most-teens-prefer-face-to-face-communication
[https://perma.cc/6JYP-VVD4].
66
See generally Jessica Contrera, 13, Right Now, WASHINGTON POST (May 25, 2016),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/style/2016/05/25/13-right-now-this-is-what-its-like-
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environment its own entity in need of unique rules and
government, and at present, a “widespread lack of literacy about
matters related to the Internet”67 makes it difficult to reconcile the
digital lives of students with the school’s own administration.
Though each state defines its schools differently,68 public
schools in the United States are generally those that are operated
by the state and funded by public money.69 The Fourteenth
Amendment, “as now applied to the States, protects the citizen
against the State itself and all of its creatures—Boards of
Education not excepted.”70 Though public school boards of
education have “important, delicate, and highly discretionary
functions” in “educating the youth for citizenship,” the Fourteenth
Amendment protects citizens against those running public schools,
as these administrators in their official roles act in the name of the
state.71
Although the Fourteenth Amendment protects the
constitutional rights of school children, the Supreme Court has
noted that those rights may not correspond exactly to the rights of
an adult American citizen, as constitutional protections must be
“applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment.”72 Children have much to learn in not only academic
endeavors, but also about social conventions, and schools attempt
to inculcate students with the tools they will need to be wellinformed, functioning members of society upon graduation.
Therefore, the Court has recognized that while students cannot be
subjected to only those ideas that are state-approved,73 there is an
incontestable “need for affirming the comprehensive authority of

to-grow-up-in-the-age-of-likes-lols-and-longing/?utm_term=.a6e18bc84d57
[https://perma.cc/KK97-3GPK] (exploring what it’s like to be a teenage girl these days).
67
CITRON, supra note 38, at 20.
68
Kyle Zinth, What Is a Public School? Examples and Definitions, EDUCATION
COMMISSION OF THE STATES (Sept. 2005), http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/64
/13/6413.pdf [https://perma.cc/TEB6-T4PT].
69
See generally id.
70
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).
71
See id. at 507, 509; see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683
(1986).
72
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507.
73
Id. at 511.
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the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in
schools.”74
In helping to shape the citizens of the future, schools have
recognized that “teenagers need guidance navigating the
challenges of having an online presence.”75 And, in fact, schools
nationwide are educating students and parents alike about “online
safety and digital responsibility,” an endeavor which need not
deprive children of enjoyment of their online culture.76 Rather,
civics lessons in many schools now aim to
teach the
“fundamentals of digital citizenship,”77 and focus on the “various
ways online activities deepen civic engagement, political and
cultural participation, and public conversation.”78
However, despite these necessary lessons in digital citizenship,
and given the need to balance the rights of students with the rights
of schools, tensions are understandably high where schools attempt
to regulate student speech, and the debate has only become more
contentious as schools try to regulate students’ online activity.
Though schools retain the ability to govern their hallways, online
student speech can only be restricted to a certain extent,
particularly considering the importance of an online presence to a
modern teenager. For “free speech promotes ‘democracy in the
widest possible sense, not merely at the level of governance, or at
the level of deliberation, but at the level of culture, where we
interact, create, build communities and build ourselves.’ Online
speech is crucial for self-government and cultural engagement.”79
We cannot hope, nor should we try, to deprive our students of
these opportunities. We can, however, balance the rights of the
schools against the rights of the students, and allow schools to
show their students that by using the internet responsibly, students

74

Id. at 507.
CITRON, supra note 38, at 227.
76
See id. at 247–48 (discussing journalist Julia Angwin’s approach to “active
engagement in her kids’ online lives”).
77
Id. at 227.
78
Id. at 194.
79
Id. (citing Professor Jack Balkin).
75
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can raise their voices to help better themselves and their
communities.
II. FREE SPEECH REIGNS—TO AN EXTENT: A DISSECTION OF
CURRENT DOCTRINE
A. The First Amendment Guarantees Free Speech to Adults
Within Limits
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
provides, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.”80 Though the language of the First
Amendment may seem clear, its application is not always simple.81
Since the ratification of the Bill of Rights over 225 years ago,82 the
Supreme Court of the United States has wrestled with the issues
that arise when free speech is guaranteed to a society.83 While our
country has a “profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen,”84 the need for uninhibited discussion must be balanced
against Government interests in regulating certain kinds of speech.
Therefore, rather than an absolute protection of any and all kinds
of speech, “the First Amendment has been interpreted as an

80

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See generally What Does Free Speech Mean?, UNITED STATES COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/about-educationaloutreach/activity-resources/what-does [https://perma.cc/FEB8-SY73] (last visited Nov. 6,
2018) (explaining what freedom of speech generally encompasses, and what it does not).
82
Bill of Rights of the United States of America (1791), BILL OF RIGHTS INST.,
http://www.billofrightsinstitute.org/founding-documents/bill-of-rights/
[https://perma.cc/KZG3-VLSF] (last visited Nov. 6, 2018).
83
See generally What Does Free Speech Mean?, supra note 82 (explaining what
freedom of speech generally encompasses, and what it does not); see also Lata Nott, Is
Your Speech Protected by the First Amendment?, NEWSEUM INST.,
http://www.newseuminstitute.org/first-amendment-center/primers/basics/
[https://perma.cc/8MJC-FHH5] (last visited Nov. 6, 2018) (dissecting whether a given
issue might raise First Amendment claims with a basic guide).
84
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
81
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instruction to treat rules limiting speech with a high level of
suspicion.”85
The Supreme Court has emphasized that “at the heart of the
First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance
of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest
and concern,”86 and in doing so has distinguished that which must
be protected by the First Amendment from that which cannot be.
To begin, “if there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that government may not prohibit the expression
of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.”87
In this vein, the Supreme Court has decided that freedom of
speech includes, but is not necessarily limited to, the right to speak
symbolically in protest (as, for example, one does when burning
the American Flag88 or wearing a symbolic article of clothing in
protest, like an armband),89 the right to use offensive words in a
political message,90 and the right to refrain from speaking
altogether.91 As a country we allow more speech than is desirable
to some people, because living with the consequences of that
sometimes unwanted speech is preferable to allowing the
government to decide categorically which ideas are permissible
topics of discussion and which are not.92
Still, the Court has found that the First Amendment does not
protect certain speech,93 and in fact “permits restrictions upon the
content of speech in a few limited areas, which are of such slight

85

CITRON, supra note 38, at 199.
Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988).
87
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
88
United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 397.
89
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
90
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
91
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
92
See CITRON, supra note 38, at 199–200.
93
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942)) (discussing that the “protections afforded by the First
Amendment . . . are not absolute, and we have long recognized that the government may
regulate certain categories of expression consistent with the Constitution”). See generally
Nott, supra note 83 (dissecting whether a given issue might raise First Amendment
claims with a basic guide).
86
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social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.”94 Unprotected categories of speech include that which
communicates a true threat,95 incites harmful action,96 or that
involves the production and distribution of obscene materials.97
B. Constitutional Rights of Children Are Not Necessarily the
Same as Those of Adults
In its exploration of the scope of First Amendment protection,
the Supreme Court has encountered several problems concerning
free speech in public schools.98 Whether in school or out of school,
students “are ‘persons’ under our Constitution,” and “are possessed
of fundamental rights which the State must respect . . . .”99 Public
school officials who seek to punish student speech do so as state
actors100 on behalf of the United States government,101 and any
such punishment may therefore run afoul of the First
Amendment.102 Nonetheless, the Court has recognized that because
94

Black, 538 U.S. at 358–59 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 359. The Court explains that the “First Amendment permits a state to ban ‘true
threats,’ e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708, 89 S. Ct. 1399, 22 L.Ed.2d 664
(per curiam), which encompass those statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a
particular individual or group of individuals . . . . The speaker need not actually intend to
carry out the threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats protects individuals from the fear
of violence and the disruption that fear engenders, as well as from the possibility that the
threatened violence will occur.” Id. at 344.
96
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
97
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
98
See supra note 11 (explaining that this Note analyzes the First Amendment rights of
American public school students only).
99
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
100
See id. at 507, 509; see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683
(1986).
101
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 424 (2007) (asserting that “[w]hen public school
authorities regulate student speech, they act as agents of the State; they do not stand in
the shoes of the students’ parents.”) (Alito, J., concurring); see also Tinker, 393 U.S. at
507 (noting that the Court has said “the Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the
States, protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures—Boards of
Education not excepted.”); id. at 509 (stipulating that “in order for the State in the person
of school officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression . . . ”) (emphasis
added).
102
See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (explaining that “[i]n order for the State in the person of
school officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able
95
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of the important role educators play in raising the next generation
of American citizens, there is a need to uphold the “comprehensive
authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with
fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control
conduct in the schools.”103 The Supreme Court has addressed this
tension multiple times over the last fifty years, and has ultimately
determined that while neither “students [nor] teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
school house gate,”104 “the constitutional rights of students in
public schools are not automatically coextensive with the rights of
adults in other settings.”105
The Supreme Court has decided four cases in the past fifty
years that help strike the balance between the free speech rights of
students and the need for educators to maintain order in schools.106
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District set
forth the standard on which the other three subsequent decisions
expand, stipulating that a school may punish a student’s selfexpression where that expression “materially and substantially”
disrupts the “operation of the school” or “collid[es] with the rights
of others.”107 Building on this idea, the Court found in Fraser that
schools may punish student speech that “undermine[s] the school’s
basic educational mission” in its vulgarity or lewdness.108
Similarly, the Hazelwood Court decided that school officials can
constitutionally preside in an editorial capacity over expressive
student speech in school-sponsored activities if their edits are
to show that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. Certainly
where there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would
‘materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in
the operation of the school,’ the prohibition cannot be sustained.”) (internal citations
omitted).
103
Id. at 507.
104
Id. at 506.
105
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682.
106
See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); see infra Sections II.B.1–
II.B.4 (discussing each of these cases in turn).
107
393 U.S. at 513 (internal citations omitted).
108
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.
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“reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”109 Finally,
the Court determined that a school’s ability to apply these
standards cannot be constricted by the physical bounds of the
schoolyard, and found that student code of conduct rules apply
during “school-sanctioned activities,” such as field trips.110 This
determination allowed the Court to find that schools need not
“tolerate at school events student expression”111 that “they
reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use.”112 This Part
examines the Court’s reasoning in each of these cases in depth
below.
1. Tinker
Current law governing the regulation of public-school student
speech stems from one landmark Supreme Court decision. In
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the
Court evaluated the contentious school punishment of a few high
school students who were suspended for wearing black armbands
to school in protest of the Vietnam War.113 The school argued a
need to quell the student speech because armbands protesting such
a controversial war might cause disruption among the students, and
decided that the suspensions would last until the protesting
students returned to school without their armbands.114 Finding the
school’s justification for punishment reasonable, the District Court
dismissed the students’ complaint.115 The equally divided Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision en banc on
appeal, and the Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari.116
In its analysis of the issue, the Supreme Court emphasized that
wearing such armbands in protest is “closely akin to ‘pure speech,’
which, [it has] repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive

109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116

Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 273.
Morse, 551 U.S. at 400–01.
Id. at 410.
Id. at 408 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Id. at 504.
Id. at 504–05.
Id. at 505.
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protection under the First Amendment.”117 Asserting, however,
that First Amendment rights in schools must be “applied in light of
the special characteristics of the school environment,”118 the Court
employed a balancing test to address the tensions that emerge
where student speech conflicts with school policy.119 Tinker
stipulates that a student may express his opinion “if he does so
without materially and substantially interfering with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school and without colliding with the rights of others.”120 The
Court expounded on this standard, noting that student conduct
“ . . . in class or out of it, which for any reason—whether it seems
from time, place, or type of behavior—materially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights
of others is . . . not immunized by the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of speech.”121 The Court was careful to emphasize that
though a school may punish speech that it reasonably forecasts to
be or deems actually substantially disruptive,122 it must be “able to
show that its action was caused by something more than a mere
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always
accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”123
Notably, the school did not prohibit students from wearing
political or controversial symbols of any kind all together, but only
these specific armbands.124 The Court stated that “the prohibition
of expression of one particular opinion, at least without evidence
that it is necessary to avoid material and substantial interference
with schoolwork or discipline, is not constitutionally
permissible.”125 The armbands caused “discussion outside of the
classroom,”126 but because the protesting students “neither
interrupted school activities nor sought to intrude in the school
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126

Id. at 505–06.
Id. at 506.
Id. at 507.
Id. at 513 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 513. This will hereinafter be referred to as the “Tinker standard.”
Id. at 514.
Id. at 509.
Id. at 510–11.
Id. at 511.
Id. at 514.
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affairs or the lives of others,”127 the Court concluded that the
school could not Constitutionally prohibit the protesting students’
speech.128 The Court has taken up the issue in more detail since
deciding Tinker in 1969, but the Tinker test129 has served as a
helpful signpost in cases involving the free speech rights of
students.
2. Fraser
Expanding on Tinker, the Supreme Court noted in Bethel
School District v. Fraser130 that the objective of public education is
to “inculcat[e] [in students the] fundamental values necessary to
the maintenance of a democratic political system.”131 And because
the classroom is a “marketplace of ideas,”132 these fundamental
values “must, of course, include tolerance of divergent political
and religious views.”133 However, the freedom to espouse
“unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms
must be balanced against the society’s countervailing interest in
teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate
behavior.”134 To teach students the bounds of appropriate social
interaction in our society involves teaching them what sort of
language is appropriate for students to use when communicating
with their peers at school.135
The controversy in Fraser arose when a high school student
addressed his classmates at an assembly in a speech nominating a
127

Id.
Id.
129
In summary, the Tinker test, or Tinker standard, is the aforementioned principle that
was first articulated in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,
which provides that a student has a right to express his ideas at school, but only if he does
so without significantly disrupting the school environment or infringing on the rights of
his classmates in that environment. Student speech that is significantly disruptive of the
school environment or infringes on the rights of his classmates is not protected by the
First Amendment, and is subject to constitutional punishment by the school. Id. at 513–
14; see supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text.
130
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
131
Id. at 681 (internal citations omitted).
132
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 739.
133
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 683.
128
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friend for elected student office. Students were required to either
attend the speech or report to study hall.136 Throughout his speech,
the speaker used an “elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual
metaphor”137 that two teachers with whom he had previously
discussed the speech had warned him not to use.138 The school felt
that given the captive audience, the relative age and maturity of the
audience members, and the audience reaction, such sexual
language was not appropriate, and that the speech violated the
school rule prohibiting disruptive, obscene behavior.139 The
speaker was suspended for three days, and removed from the list of
candidates for commencement speaker at graduation.140 The
student appealed his punishment to the school board, who affirmed
the school’s decision, at which point the student brought suit in
District Court for violation of his First Amendment rights.141
Though the District Court ruled in favor of the school and the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision,142 the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.143
The Court ultimately decided that “the First Amendment does
not prevent the school officials from determining that to permit a
vulgar and lewd speech such as respondent’s would undermine the

136

Id. at 677.
Id. at 678. The speaker’s address read as follows: “I know a man who is firm—he’s
firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his character is firm—but most . . . of all, his
belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm. Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point
and pounds it in. If necessary, he’ll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn’t attack
things in spurts—he drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally—he succeeds. Jeff is a
man who will go to the very end—even the climax, for each and every one of you. So
vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president—he’ll never come between you and the best our
high school can be.” Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
138
Id. at 678.
139
Id. at 677–78.
140
Id. at 678.
141
Id. at 678–79.
142
The District Court held that “the school’s sanctions violated the First Amendment,
that the school’s disruptive-conduct rule was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and
that the removal of [the student’s] name from the graduation speaker’s list violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 675. The student was awarded
monetary relief and the school was prevented from keeping him from speaking at
commencement. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Id.
143
Id. at 677.
137
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school’s basic educational mission.”144 While the First Amendment
allows adults to use profanity or otherwise offensive language to
express political messages,145 “the constitutional rights of students
in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights
of adults in other settings,”146 and a school may therefore
constitutionally ban “lewd, indecent, or offensive speech,” as
undermining “the essential lessons of civil, mature conduct” that
the school wishes to teach its students.147
3. Hazelwood
As a school may distance itself from student speech it deems to
undermine its educational mission,148 so too may it distance itself
from student speech with which it does not wish to be associated as
an educational institution.149 Following Fraser, the Court clarified
that a school’s obligation to tolerate certain student speech (as per
the Tinker standard)150 does not obligate a school to actively
promote certain student speech.151 While Tinker addresses an
“educator’s ability to silence a student’s personal expression that
happens to occur on the school premises,” the idea of promotion
concerns an “educator’s authority over school-sponsored
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities
that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably
perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”152
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,153 the Court
concluded that the “standard articulated in Tinker for determining
when a school may punish student expression154 need not also be

144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154

Id. at 685.
Id. at 682.
Id.
Id. at 683.
Id. at 675.
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
Id. at 270.
Id.
Id. at 271.
484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
See supra notes 114, 130 and accompanying text.
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the standard for determining when a school may refuse to lend its
name and resources to the dissemination of student expression.”155
This issue arose when a principal censored portions of a school
newspaper shortly before its publication. The student journalists
who contributed to the paper did so as part of a journalism class,156
and every edition of the paper was edited and reviewed by both the
teacher of the class and the school principal.157 The final edition of
the paper that school year was set to include an article about teen
pregnancy at Hazelwood East high school, and an article about the
effect of divorce on students at the high school,158 but the principal
was concerned about the content of the articles in relation to the
audience.159 Because it was late April, the principal “believed there
was no time to make the necessary changes in the stories before the
scheduled press run and that the newspaper would not appear
before the end of the school year if printing were delayed to any
significant extent.”160 Rather than print no newspaper at all, the
principal chose to redact the two controversial articles from the
final edition of the school’s newspaper before publication.161
Thereafter, the students brought suit in District Court for violation
of their First Amendment rights, and the District Court found that
no such violation had occurred.162 The Court of Appeals for the

155

484 U.S. at 272–73.
Id. at 262, 268.
157
Id. at 263, 269.
158
Id. at 263.
159
Id. at 264. “[Principal] Reynolds was concerned that, although the pregnancy story
used false names ‘to keep the identity of these girls a secret,’ the pregnant students still
might be identifiable from the text. He also believed that the article’s references to sexual
activity and birth control were inappropriate for some of the younger students at the
school. In addition, Reynolds was concerned that a student identified by name in the
divorce story had complained that her father ‘wasn’t spending enough time with my
mom, my sister and I’ prior to the divorce, ‘was always out of town on business or out
late playing cards with the guys,’ and ‘always argued about everything’ with her mother.
Reynolds believed that the student’s parents should have been given an opportunity to
respond to these remarks or to consent to their publication. He was unaware that [the
teacher of the journalism class] had deleted the student’s name from the final version of
the article.” Id. at 263 (internal citations omitted).
160
Id. at 263–64.
161
Id. at 264.
162
Id.
156
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Eighth Circuit reversed and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.163
Fraser allows for a school to “disassociate itself” from student
speech that is “wholly inconsistent with the fundamental values of
public school education,”164 and Hazelwood expands on this idea
to permit a school, “in its capacity as publisher of a school
newspaper or producer of a school play” to reject student “speech
that is, for example, ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately
researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable
for immature audiences.”165 That is to say, the First Amendment
does not prevent educators from “exercising editorial control over
the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored
expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related
to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”166
4. Morse
The regulation of the student speech at issue in Tinker, Fraser,
and Hazelwood stems from the need for a school to manage the
school environment and other educational concerns.167
Significantly, the speech at issue in all three of those cases
occurred on school grounds.168 The school environment is not
strictly limited to the school grounds, however, and accordingly,
“there is some uncertainty at the outer boundaries as to when
courts should apply school speech precedents.”169 The Court
addressed this question at least in part in deciding Morse v.
Frederick.170
The dispute in Morse stems from a school-sanctioned event in
which students attended the Olympic Torch Relay (the “Relay”)

163

Id. at 265–66.
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685–86 (1986) (internal citations
omitted).
165
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
166
Id. at 273.
167
See discussion supra Sections II.B.1–II.B.3.
168
See discussion supra Sections II.B.1–II.B.3.
169
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007) (citing Porter v. Ascension Parish
Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615 n.22 (2004)).
170
Id.
164
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passing through their town of Juneau, Alaska in 2002.171 Students
were permitted to attend the Relay as it passed down a street
adjacent to the school, and were supervised by school faculty
throughout the event.172 A group of students, apparently enticed by
the press that was covering the event, unfurled a large banner that
read “BONG HiTS 4 [sic] JESUS” in lettering clearly visible from
the other side of the road.173 The school principal immediately
asked the students to take down the banner because she feared it
promoted illegal drug use, and she confiscated it when all but one
student complied.174 The noncompliant student was suspended for
ten days and when his suspension was upheld on appeal to the
superintendent, the student filed suit alleging his First Amendment
rights had been violated.175 The District Court found in favor of
the school, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.176
Having granted certiorari, the Supreme Court determined that
an “approved social event or class trip” that was sanctioned by the
principal, supervised by school faculty, and that took place during
normal school hours was a “school-sanctioned activity,” to which
the school’s student code of conduct rules applied.177 The Court
also found that the “‘special characteristics of the school
environment,’ and governmental interest in stopping student drug
abuse . . . allow schools to restrict student expression that they
reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use.”178 Consequently,
the Court held that “the First Amendment does not require schools
to tolerate at school events student expression that contributes to
those dangers.”179 Despite having elaborated on the boundaries of
the schoolyard in this way, however, the Supreme Court has yet to
delineate where schools are to draw the line in relation to student

171

Id. at 397.
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id. at 398.
175
Id. at 398–99.
176
Id. at 399.
177
Id. at 400–01.
178
Id. at 408 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969)).
179
Id. at 410.
172
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speech that is posted online from outside of school and after school
hours.180
C. An Uncertain Standard Governs Off-Campus Online Student
Speech
In the Internet Age, balancing student free speech rights and
the need for school officials to maintain order in schools has
become more difficult.181 While it is not disputed that online posts
are speech that is entitled to First Amendment protection,182 “the
advent of the Internet has complicated analysis of restrictions on
speech,”183 and of restrictions on student speech in particular.
Schools may regulate student online speech that is posted on
campus or using campus resources per the Tinker standard and its
progeny.184 But having denied certiorari to Bell v. Itawamba
County School Board,185 the Supreme Court has not decided
whether Tinker applies to student speech that is posted online from
off campus, or even whether there exists a relationship between
off-campus online speech and the school at all.186 However, of the
six circuits to have addressed this issue, five have held that Tinker
does apply in such instances.187 In the “other of the six circuits [to
have addressed the question] (the third circuit), there is an intracircuit split.”188
180

The Court most recently declined to hear a case of this nature by denying certiorari
to Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
1166 (2016).
181
See discussion infra Sections II.C.1–II.C.3.
182
Nott, supra note 94; see generally Robert Corn-Revere, Internet & First Amendment
INST.,
http://www.newseuminstitute.org/first-amendmentOverview,
NEWSEUM
center/topics/freedom-of-speech-2/internet-first-amendment/
[https://perma.cc/E2WUEUDN] (last visited Nov. 6, 2018).
183
J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 863–64 (Sup. Ct. Pa.
2002).
184
See supra Sections II.A–II.B.
185
See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
186
Section II.C discusses cases arising from student speech that was posted online from
off campus, away from any school-sponsored event, and with the use of no school
resources, and that was subsequently punished in some way by the speakers’ schools.
187
Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 393 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136
S. Ct. 1166 (2016). The “remainder of the circuits (first, sixth, seventh, tenth, eleventh,
D.C.) do not appear to have addressed this issue.” Id. at 394.
188
Id. at 393.
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Though Tinker has generally been applied to off-campus online
student speech by courts that have addressed the matter,189 there is
no consensus as to what sort of online student speech can be
reasonably deemed to be foreseeably or actually disruptive of the
school environment such that the school may constitutionally
punish the speaker. That is, once Tinker is applied, there is no
standard governing what sort of off-campus online speech is
reasonably forecast as or is actually disruptive of a school
environment. In the absence of a standard, and because the
disciplinary decisions of school officials are owed deference to
some extent,190 courts generally consider the totality of the
circumstances of the off-campus online student speech in each case
when evaluating the school’s ability to punish the speaker. Factors
that courts have considered in these evaluations include:

189

Id. For example, the Second Circuit allows schools to punish off-campus online
student speech under Tinker’s test of forecasted substantial disruption “at least when it
[is] similarly foreseeable that the off-campus expression might also reach campus.”
Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted).
Similarly, “the general rule [of the Eighth Circuit] is that off-campus statements are
protected under the First Amendment and not punishable by school authorities unless
they are true threats or are reasonably calculated to reach the school environment and are
so egregious as to pose a serious safety risk or other substantial disruption in that
environment.” Sagehorn v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 122 F. Supp. 3d 842, 856 (D.
Minn. 2015) (2011) (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). The Fifth Circuit
dictates that “Tinker governs our analysis . . . when a student intentionally directs at the
school community speech reasonably understood by school officials to threaten, harass,
and intimidate a teacher, even when such speech originated and was disseminated, offcampus without the use of school resources.” Bell, 799 F.3d at 396.
190
See Bell, 799 F.3d at 393 (noting “the paramount need for school officials to be able
to react quickly and efficiently to protect students and faculty from threats, intimidation,
and harassment intentionally directed at the school community” [without fearing
litigation]); see also Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Bd., 728 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir.
2013) (stating “we look to all of the circumstances confronting the school officials that
might reasonably portend disruption”); id. at 1072 (noting that the court’s responsibility
“is not to parse the wisdom of [the school’s] actions, but to determine whether they were
constitutional.”); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34,
40 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1296 (2008) (stating that “we are mindful that it
is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decisions of school administrators which
the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion.”) (internal citations
omitted); Bell, 799 F.3d at 398, (observing “that courts should not interfere with the dayto-day operations of schools is a platitudinous but eminently sound maxim which this
court has reaffirmed on many occasions.”) (internal citations omitted).
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The nature and content of the speech, the objective
and subjective seriousness of the speech, and the
severity of the possible consequences should the
speaker take action; the relationship of the speech to
the school, the intent of the speaker to disseminate,
or keep private, the speech, and the nature, and
severity, of the school’s response in disciplining the
student; whether the speaker expressly identified an
educator or student by name or reference, and past
incidents arising out of similar speech; the manner
in which the speech reached the school community;
the intent of the school in disciplining the student;
and the occurrence of other in-school disturbances,
including administrative disturbances involving the
speaker, such as ‘school officials having to spend
considerable time dealing with these concerns and
ensuring that appropriate safety measures were in
place,’ brought about ‘because of the need to
manage’ concerns over the speech.191
These factors are many and varied, for as Judge D. Brooks
Smith of the Third Circuit notes, were the standard to “turn solely
on where the speaker was sitting when the speech was originally
uttered,” that standard “would fail to accommodate the somewhat
‘everywhere at once’ nature of the Internet,”192 and further, would
fail to contemplate the “special characteristics of the school
environment.”193 Many of these factors are intertwined, and must
be evaluated as such. The entangled nature of some factors often
complicates the analysis of the student speech at issue and leads to
less predictable outcomes of seemingly similar cases. Accordingly,
191

Bell, 799 F.3d at 398 (internal citations omitted).
J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 940 (3d Cir. 2011)
(Smith, J., concurring).
193
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969); see also
Bell, 799 F.3d at 396 (noting that “in holding Tinker applies to the off-campus speech in
this instance, because such determinations are heavily influenced by the facts in each
matter, we decline: to adopt any rigid standard in this instance; or to adopt or reject
approaches advocated by other circuits”); Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1069 (stipulating that “a
student’s profanity-laced parody of a principal is hardly the same as a threat of a school
shooting, and we are reluctant to try and craft a one-size fits all approach.”).
192
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determining the reasonableness of discipline based on forecasted or
actual substantial disruption resulting from online student speech is
more of an art than a science, and the courts’ considerations are
worth organizing into analytical categories to explore further indepth.
1. Nature of Post
The nature of the post examined is an important consideration
in many cases.194 That is, in considering whether the school can
punish the student expression at issue, many courts weigh heavily
the character of the student speech, considering, for example,
whether the post was meant to be artistic, funny, harassing,
satirical, political, violent, or threatening.195 The analysis of the
nature of the speech may overlap with other factors the courts
consider, but is an important factor in and of itself.
a) Violent/Threatening Speech
The First Amendment categorically does not protect true
threats.196 This means that those statements by which “the speaker
means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit
an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of
individuals”197 are not entitled to First Amendment protection. A
true threat is not negated by the fact that the speaker does not
intend to carry out his threat,198 as “a prohibition on true threats
protects individuals from the fear of violence and from the
disruption that fear engenders, in addition to protecting people
from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.”199

194

See discussion infra Section II.C.1.
See discussion infra Section II.C.1.
196
David L. Hudson, Jr. & Rebecca DeVerter, Online Speech, NEWSEUM INST. (Mar.
2008),
http://www.newseuminstitute.org/first-amendment-center/topics/freedom-of-speech-2/k12-public-school-student-expression/cyberspeech/ [https://perma.cc/WW47-VT9Y]; see
generally Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
197
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 708) (noting
that “political hyperbole is not a true threat”) (internal citations omitted).
198
Id. at 360.
199
Id. (internal citations omitted). Note that “intimidation in the constitutionally
proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to
195
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Some courts choose to evaluate a violent or threatening off-campus
online student post by this true threat First Amendment standard,200
but other courts feel that “school officials have significantly
broader authority to sanction student speech than the [true threat]
standard allows.”201
Though aware of “the need to draw a clear line between
student activity that ‘affects matter of legitimate concern to the
school community,’ and activity that does not,”202 the Second
Circuit allows a school to punish a student’s off-campus online
speech ‘when this conduct would foreseeably create a risk of
substantial disruption within the school environment,’ at least
when it [is] similarly foreseeable that the off-campus expression
might also reach campus.”203 In Wisniewski v. Board of
Education,204 the court examined an icon displayed next to a
student’s name on his AOL Instant Messenger account205 that
depicted a drawing of his teacher being shot with the words “Kill
Mr. VanderMolen” written beneath, and that was visible to at least
fifteen of his “buddies”206 online for three weeks.207 Both the
a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm
or death.” Id.
200
Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir.
2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1296 (2008).
201
Id. at 38.
202
Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Thomas v. Bd. of Educ.,
607 F.2d 1043, 1058 n.13 (2d Cir. 1979)).
203
Id. at 48 (quoting Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 40).
204
Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 34.
205
AOL Instant Messenger was a computer software that allowed its users to exchange
messages in real time over the Internet with their “buddies” (i.e., those with whom one
had connected on the application). See id. at 35.
206
See infra note 206 (describing AOL Instant Messenger).
207
Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36. After a classmate of the student on whose AOL Instant
Messenger account the icon appeared brought the icon to the attention of the teacher
depicted, the student was suspended for a week. Id. The police investigated the student,
and ultimately found “that the icon was meant as a joke,” and that the student “posed no
real threat to VanderMolen or any other school official.” Id. The student was assessed by
a psychologist who reached a similar conclusion, and the criminal investigation of the
student was closed. Id. The superintendent held a hearing regarding the student’s longterm suspension, and the hearing officer decided that “the icon was threatening and
should not have been understood as a joke.” Id. Though the student had posted the icon
from off-campus, the hearing officer “concluded that it was in violation of school rules
and disrupted school operations by requiring special attention from school officials,
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“potentially threatening content of the icon and the extensive
distribution of it”208 made it reasonably foreseeable that it would
“come to the attention of school authorities and the teacher whom
the icon depicted being shot.”209 The court further noted that “there
can be no doubt that the icon, once made known to the teacher and
other school officials, would foreseeably create a risk of substantial
disruption within the school environment.”210
The Eighth Circuit also addressed a First Amendment question
arising “from school discipline exercised in response to student
threats of violence” that were communicated online outside of
school,211 but were reported directly to the school.212 In D.J.M. ex
rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Public School District No. 60, a student sent
instant messages to a friend lamenting that he had been rejected by
a peer he admired romantically, but that he would let her live if he
were ever to shoot any of his classmates.213 He then named specific
students that he would “have to get rid of,” along with groups of
people that “would have to go” if he were to shoot his
classmates.214 This student indicated to his friend that he wanted
“[their high school] to be known for something,”215 and his
alarmed friend alerted both a trusted adult and the school principal
of these messages.216 Though constitutionally schools cannot
“reach out to discover, monitor, or punish any type of out of school
speech . . . when a report is brought to them about a student
threatening to shoot specific students at school . . . they have a

replacement of the threatened teacher, and interviewing pupils during class time.” Id.
With the Board of Education’s approval, the student was suspended for one semester. Id.
at 37. The student thereafter brought suit in District Court against the superintendent and
the Board of Education, alleging violation of his First Amendment rights. Id.
208
Id. at 39.
209
Id.
210
Id. at 40. The icon did, in fact, create a substantial disruption, “requiring special
attention from school officials, replacement of the threatened teacher, and interviewing
pupils during class time.” Id. at 36.
211
D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 761 (8th Cir.
2011).
212
Id.
213
Id. at 758.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Id.
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difficult and important choice to make about how to react
consistent with the First Amendment.”217 In this case, the court
found it reasonably foreseeable that the student’s “threats about
shooting specific students in school would be brought to the
attention of school authorities and create a risk of substantial
disruption within the school environment,”218 noting that the
student could anticipate that his messages would become known to
other students, “since a reasonable person should be aware that
electronic communications can now be easily forwarded.”219 In
fact, once rumors spread about the messages in question,220
“school officials had to spend considerable time dealing with [the
safety] concerns [of parents and students], and ensuring that
appropriate safety measures were in place”221 at the school.222
The Ninth Circuit, in deciding Wynar v. Douglas County
School Board, similarly examined a school’s reaction in a case in
which a student made threatening communications online from off
campus to his friends, and those friends reported the messages to
the school.223 The court noted that students take to the internet to
discuss all sorts of things “outside of the official school
environment,”224 and while schools “must take care not to

217

Id. at 765 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 766 (internal citations omitted).
219
Id. at 762.
220
Id. at 765.
221
Id. at 766.
222
Subsequent cases have further clarified the Eighth Circuit standard articulated in
Hannibal. See S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lees Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 777
(8th Cir. 2012) (explaining “in D.J.M. v. Hannibal Public School District #60, we
indicated that Tinker applies to off-campus student speech where it is reasonably
foreseeable that the speech will reach the school community and cause a substantial
disruption to the educational setting. 647 F.3d 754, 766 (8th Cir. 2011)”); see also Burge
ex rel. Burge v. Colton Sch. Dist. 53, 100 F. Supp. 3d 1057, 1071 (D. Or. 2015) (citing
Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 2013)) (noting that
“a number of our sister circuits have wrestled with the question of Tinker’s reach beyond
the schoolyard. The Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits have concluded that Tinker
applies to certain off-campus speech. These Circuits have imposed some additional
threshold test before applying Tinker to speech that originates off campus. For
example . . . the Eighth Circuit requires that it be ‘reasonably foreseeable that the speech
will reach the school community . . . ’”).
223
728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013).
224
Id. at 1064.
218
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overreact and to take into account the creative juices and often
startling writings of the students,”225 students do sometimes
“communicat[e] electronically . . . about subjects that threaten the
safety of the school environment.”226 Indeed, when a student sent
to his friends from home “increasingly violent and threatening
instant messages227 . . . bragging about his weapons, threatening to
shoot specific classmates, intimating that he would ‘take out’ other
people at a school shooting on a specific date, and invoking the
image of the Virginia Tech massacre,”228 they became so alarmed
as to alert school officials.229 The court found that in such cases the
school must be able to balance student speech concerns against the
need to “protect their students from credible threats of violence.”230
Certainly, “given the subject and addressees” of the messages, “it
is hard to imagine how their nexus to the school could have been
more direct; for the same reasons, it should have reasonably
foreseeable to [the student] that his messages would reach
campus.”231 To be sure, “the alarming nature of the messages
prompted [the student’s] friends to do exactly what we would hope
any responsible student would do: report to school authorities,”232
in the hopes that the school could help. This student’s messages
“threatened the student body as a whole and targeted specific
students by name,” not only representing the “quintessential harm
to the rights of other students to be secure,”233 but also leading to
what could reasonably be forecast as substantial disruption of the
school environment.234

225

Id.
Id.
227
See supra note 206 (describing AOL Instant Messenger).
228
Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1071.
229
Id. at 1066.
230
Id. at 1070.
231
Id. at 1069.
232
Id.
233
Id. at 1072.
234
Id. at 1071. In this scenario, the school officials “reasonably could have predicted
that they would have to spend considerable time dealing with parents’ and students’
concerns and ensuring that appropriate safety measures were in place.” Id. (quoting
D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 766 (8th Cir.
2011)) (internal citations omitted).
226
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The Fifth Circuit’s standard governing threatening off-campus
online speech is more bright-line than those discussed supra, as it
decided in Bell v. Itawamba County School Board,235 that Tinker
applies “when a student intentionally directs at the school
community speech reasonably understood by school officials to
threaten, harass, and intimidate a teacher, even when the speech
originated off campus.”236 In Bell, a student posted a video of
himself using vulgar, profane language to rap about two named
coaches at his high school, accusing the coaches of sexual
misconduct with female students.237 The lyrics included the
admonitions, “betta [sic] watch your back,” “I’m going to hit you
with my [gun],” “going to get a pistol down your mouth,” and
“he[’ll] get no mercy.”238 The video was posted to both Facebook
and YouTube, and was accessible on both platforms to the public
at large.239 Though the student contended he intended neither that
the coaches hear the rap nor understand it as a threat, he knew that
his peers would hear it, as “students all have Facebook.”240 Even if
he only wanted to raise awareness of the coaches alleged
misconduct as he claimed,241 “the manner in which he voiced his
concern . . . must be taken seriously by school officials.”242
Because “threatening, harassing, and intimidating a teacher
impedes, if not destroys the ability to teach,” and because such
behavior “disrupts, if not destroys the discipline necessary for an
environment in which education can take place,” it ultimately
“disrupts, if not destroys, the very mission for which schools
exist—to educate,”243 and is reasonably forecast to cause a
substantial disruption of the school environment.244

235

Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.
Ct. 1166 (2016).
236
Id. at 379.
237
Id. at 384.
238
Id. at 384–85.
239
Id. at 385.
240
Id. at 386.
241
Id. at 398.
242
Id.
243
Id. at 399–400.
244
Id. at 400.
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Assuming Tinker applies to off-campus online student speech,
and because the speech at issue in each of the cases discussed
above was reasonably forecast as substantially disruptive, the
students’ First Amendment rights were not violated when their
schools punished them for their off-campus online speech.
However, because ours is not a society that generally sanitizes
speech, “the mere fact that someone might take offense to the
content of the speech is not sufficient justification for prohibiting
it.”245 Further, “not every off-hand reference to violence is a true
threat unprotected by the First Amendment.”246 This distinction
becomes particularly evident in comparing different sorts of
violent student speech in the context of the school environment.247
In Burge ex rel. Burge v. Colton School District 53, the United
States District Court for the District of Oregon analyzed violent
comments a student made on his own Facebook page.248 Initially,
the student posted that he wanted to start a petition to get his
teacher fired, as “she’s the worst teacher ever.”249 After a friend
asked why the student thought this, he responded “she’s just a
bitch haha . . . she needs to be shot.”250 Though the posts were
visible for less than one day, as the student’s mother, who
monitored his Facebook account, had her son take them down,251 a
parent of other children in the school anonymously turned a print
out of the posts into the principal six weeks later.252 Following his
three-and-one-half-day in-school suspension for his post, the
student brought suit, alleging violation of his First Amendment
rights.253 The District Court analyzed the language of the posts
against the Ninth Circuit decision in Wynar v. Douglas County

245

Burge ex rel. Burge v. Colton Sch. Dist. 53, 100 F. Supp. 3d 1057, 1063 (D. Or.
2015) (quoting J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 930 (3d
Cir. 2011)).
246
Id. at 1068.
247
See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 424 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that
“schools can be places of special danger”).
248
100 F. Supp. 3d 1057 (D. Or. 2015).
249
Id. at 1060.
250
Id.
251
Id.
252
Id. at 1061.
253
Id. at 1060–61.
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School District254 and found that “under Wynar, if [the student’s]
off-campus comments constitute an ‘identifiable threat of school
violence’ and would substantially disrupt or materially interfere
with school activities, then [the school] could discipline him
without violating the First Amendment.”255 Because “the Ninth
Circuit did not explain in Wynar what constitutes ‘an identifiable
threat of school violence,’” the district court looked to whether the
school could reasonably foresee that the student’s comments would
“materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.”256
The student’s comments did not have “any impact on
classroom activities.”257 There was no “widespread whispering
campaign [at school], and [the post] was not discussed by students
at school or anywhere else.”258 In fact, in the six weeks before the
comments were brought to the attention of the school, “no one
talked about or otherwise acknowledged them,”259 and the student
continued to attend the class of the teacher he had posted about, in
which there were “no disciplinary issues.”260 Further, unlike in
Wynar, this student’s comments “were not explicitly violent and
graphic,” he had no history of violent behavior, and had no access
to weapons.261 Even once the school became aware of the posts, its
“conduct evidenced no fear of future substantial disruption or
violence.”262 Given these circumstances, the District Court
deduced that “no reasonable fact-finder could conclude that [the
student’s] Facebook comments were reasonably likely to cause the
type of future substantial disruption required by Tinker” and the

254

For discussion of Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Bd., 728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013),
see supra notes 224–35 and accompanying text.
255
Burge, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 1071.
256
Id. at 1071–72 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 509 (1969)).
257
Id. at 1072.
258
Id.
259
Id. at 1073.
260
Id.
261
Id.
262
Id.
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school had therefore violated his First Amendment rights by
suspending him.263
b) Harassing/Cyberbullying Speech
Many posts in the cases courts have examined are violent or
threatening, but still many more harass or bully other students
without being violent. In Doninger v. Niehoff, the Second Circuit
examined a student government member’s blog post that expressed
discontent with the school’s scheduling of an extra-curricular event
(a concert),264 and encouraged her peers to contact the
“douchebags in central office” in order to express their grievances
and “piss [them] off.”265 The student brought a suit claiming
violation of her First Amendment rights after she was prevented
from running for student government as a direct result of her
post.266 Though the blog entry was posted off campus, it “directly
pertained to events”267 at school, and by the student’s own
admission was meant “to encourage more people . . . to contact the
administration.”268 The court concluded that because this post was
“purposely designed by [the student] to come onto the campus,”269
it was reasonably foreseeable that it would come to the attention of
the administrators.270 Further, the court found that due to the
student’s use of incendiary language, that she did not accurately
inform her audience of issues surrounding the scheduling of the
concert, and because rumors related to the post had “already begun
to disrupt school activities,” it was reasonably foreseeable that this
post would lead to a substantial disruption of the school
environment.271
Doninger addressed speech directed at school officials, but did
not concern speech that one student posts about another. In
Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, the Fourth Circuit addressed
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271

Id. at 1074.
Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 2008).
Id.
Id. at 46–47.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 50.
Id.
Id. at 50–51.
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“a factual circumstance where student speech targeted classmates
for verbal abuse,”272 in which a student created a Myspace page273
that featured posts and photographs insinuating another named
student had herpes, and invited one hundred of her peers to access
and edit the page, which some did.274 In its analysis of the
situation, the Fourth Circuit noted that “because, in Tinker the
students’ wearing of the armbands ‘neither interrupted school
activities nor sought to intrude in the school affairs or the lives of
others,’ there was ‘no interference with work and no disorder’ to
justify regulation of the speech.”275 Therefore, “the language of
Tinker supports the conclusion that public schools have a
‘compelling interest’ in regulating speech that interferes with or
disrupts the work and discipline of the school, including discipline
for student harassment and bullying.”276 The court further reasoned
that though the student speaker posted this page from home, “she
knew the electronic response would be, as it in fact was, published
beyond her home and could reasonably be expected to reach the
school or impact the school environment,” as she “also knew
that . . . the fallout from her conduct and the speech within the
[page] would be felt in the school itself.”277 Especially considering
that the targeted student missed school to avoid her harassers,278
this student’s speech was “materially and substantially disruptive
in that it interfered with the schools’ work and collided with the
rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone.”279
In contrast to the off-campus online speech that courts have
found reasonably forecast as substantially disruptive of the school
272

Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 571 (4th Cir. 2011).
Myspace is a “social networking site that allows its users to create webpages to
interact with other users. Users of the service are able to create blogs, upload videos and
photos, and design profiles to showcase their interests and talents. Myspace has provided
a place for users to meet new friends and keep in touch with people the world.” Myspace,
BUSINESS DICTIONARY, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/Myspace.html
[https://perma.cc/3WPD-YWV8] (last visited Nov. 6, 2018).
274
Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 567.
275
Id. at 572 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514
(1969)).
276
Id. (citing DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 319–20 (3d Cir. 2008)).
277
Id. at 573.
278
Id. at 568.
279
Id. at 573–74 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508, 513) (internal citations omitted).
273
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environment and therefore constitutionally punishable,280 schools
cannot, under Tinker, punish off-campus online speech that is not
reasonably forecast to be or is not actually disruptive of the school
environment.281 Though the Third Circuit is divided as to whether
Tinker applies to off-campus online student speech,282 the court
“assumed without deciding that Tinker applie[d]”283 to the facts of
J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District.284
In Snyder, a student was suspended for creating a fake
Myspace profile of her principal285 that was obscene, nonsensical
and though juvenile in nature, still deeply hurtful to the
principal.286 However, the court noted that the profile was indeed
so crude that it was neither realistically attributed to the principal,
nor accepted as true.287 In determining the reasonableness of a
forecasted substantial disruption of the school environment
resulting from the profile, the court directly compared the facts of
Tinker with the case at hand.288 The Snyder court noted that despite
the fact that Tinker’s armbands “took the students’ minds off their
classwork and diverted them to thoughts about the highly
emotional subject of the Vietnam War,”289 the Tinker majority held
that “‘the record does not demonstrate any facts which might
reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial
disruption of or material interference with school activities,’ and
thus that the school violated the students’ First Amendment
280

See discussion supra Section II.C.1.
See discussion supra Section II.C.
282
See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 219–20 (3d
Cir. 2011).
283
J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 926 (3d Cir. 2011).
284
Id.
285
Id. at 920.
286
Id. The profile “contained crude content and vulgar language, ranging from
nonsense and juvenile humor to profanity and shameful personal attacks aimed at the
principal and his family.” Id. Notably, the principal’s wife was a guidance counselor at
the same school. Id. at 921.
287
Id. at 921. The court emphasized that, “though disturbing, the record indicates that
the profile was so outrageous that no one took its content seriously.” Id.
288
This is remarkable in that in most cases researched for this Note, the courts
explained the facts of Tinker and used the Tinker standard and language, but did not
directly compare those facts to the facts of the case at hand.
289
Snyder, 650 F.3d at 928 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 518 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting)).
281
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rights”290 by punishing the students’ speech. Comparatively,
“beyond general rumblings, a few minutes of talking in class, and
some officials rearranging their schedules to assist [the principal]
in dealing with the profile, no disruptions occurred” as a result of
the student speech at issue in Snyder.291 Accordingly, the Third
Circuit decided that “if Tinker’s black armbands—an ostentatious
reminder of the highly emotional and controversial subject of the
Vietnam war—could not reasonably have led school authorities to
forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with
school activities, neither can [the Myspace] profile, despite the
unfortunate humiliation it caused” for the principal.292
2. Subject of Post
Though the nature of the online post in question is an important
consideration, courts have also evaluated the subject of the post in
their determination of reasonable forecast of or actual substantial
disruption. Often courts will consider the nature and subject of the
post in tandem, since the nature of the post and the subject of the
post can often be tied (as, for example, when a post threatens
someone who is the speaker’s classmate).
The “special characteristics of the school environment”293 may
allow schools to regulate certain student speech in school that, if
spoken outside of the school community would be protected by the
First Amendment,294 however, the “point of all speech protection is
to shield just those choices of content that in someone’s eyes are
misguided, or even hurtful.”295
Hence, the United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota reasoned in Sagehorn v. Independent School District

290

Id. at 929 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514 (emphasis in original)).
Id. at 929.
292
Id. at 929–30.
293
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
294
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 689 (1986) (noting that “if [the
student] had given the same speech outside of the school environment, he could not have
been penalized simply because government officials considered his language to be
inappropriate”).
295
Sagehorn v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 122 F. Supp. 3d 842, 855 (D. Minn. 2015)
(citing Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011)).
291
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No. 728296 that even if a student’s off-campus online speech is
“inappropriate, ill-advised, and offensive,”297 a school may only
punish the speech if it “is both (1) reasonably calculated to reach
the school environment and (2) so egregious as to pose a serious
safety risk or other substantial disruption in that environment.”298
The court further noted that “this is an extremely high bar,” as
courts have found this standard satisfied in only “the most violent
and threatening forms of speech,” “consistently declining to
expand it to extremely offensive but nonviolent out-of-school
speech.”299
At issue in Sagehorn was an anonymous post on a website
entitled “[High School Name] Confessions,” that asked “did [a
certain student] actually make out with [name of female teacher at
the High School]?”300 The student in question replied, “actually
yes,” which he later stated he intended as a joke.301 A parent of
another student at the high school soon contacted the school about
the posts, and the student was suspended for “damag[ing] a
teacher’s reputation.”302 The court discussed that though some may
interpret the phrase “make out” to connote sexual intercourse,303
the term “is slang that certainly has varying meanings, including
connotations not involving sexual intercourse.”304 In fact, nothing
in either the question posted or the given response or “other
allegations in the complaint suggest that [the student] was using
the term to mean sexual intercourse.”305 Further, “even if the Court
were to find that [the student’s] post unambiguously referred to
sexual intercourse, the content actually attributable to [him]—a
response of ‘actually yes’—is not nearly as graphic as the content

296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305

122 F. Supp. 3d 842 (D. Minn. 2015).
Id. at 855.
Id. at 857 (emphasis in original).
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 849.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 853.
Id. at 854.
Id.
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courts have found obscene as a matter of law.”306 The court noted
that “the fact that speech references teacher-on-student sexual
conduct does not, de facto, make the speech likely to reach the
school and cause a substantial disruption,”307 and further, that even
if the court “assumed, without deciding, that [the student’s] post
was intended to reach the school environment, there is no
indication that any disruption was, in fact, caused by [the
student’s] post.”308 In the absence of such a disruption, Tinker does
not allow the school to punish the student for his off-campus
online speech.309
Similarly, the student speech at issue in Snyder310 directly
attacked the school principal and his wife, who was one of the
school’s guidance counselors.311 The student who made the fake
Myspace profile of the principal claimed it was meant “to be a joke
between herself and her friends,”312 and despite the fact that the
profile personally attacked the principal, a guidance counselor, and
their family in crude, vulgar, and profane manner,313 the court
found that the profile “was so juvenile and nonsensical that no
reasonable person could take its content seriously, and the record
clearly demonstrates that no one did.”314 Accordingly, the court

306

Id. at 854 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 854–55 (citing Rosario v. Clark Cty.
Sch. Dist., 2013 WL 3679375 (D. Nev. July 3, 2013)) (discussing an example of a legally
obscene student tweet).
307
Id. at 858.
308
Id. “Based on the allegations in the complaint, there was no commotion, boisterous
conduct, interruption of classes, or any lack of order, discipline and decorum at the
school, as a result of [the speaker’s] posting of ‘actually yes’ on the Internet.” Id.
(internal citations omitted).
309
Id. at 859.
310
See supra notes 284–93 and accompanying text.
311
J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 920–21 (3d Cir.
2011).
312
Id. at 921. But see id. at 948 n.5 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (opining, “even if [the
speaker]’s intent were at issue, it is not so clear that the profile was intended to be a joke.
While she at one point stated that the profile was created for comical reasons, [the
speaker] also stated that she created the profile because she was ‘mad’ at [the principal]
for disciplining her. She claimed [the principal] unnecessarily yelled at her for
committing dress code violations. It is therefore fair to say that [the speaker] created the
profile in retaliation.”).
313
Id. at 920.
314
Id. at 929.
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decided that the school violated the student’s First Amendment
rights by suspending her for speech that neither caused nor could
have been forecast to cause a substantial disruption in school,315
“despite the unfortunate humiliation it caused” for the principal.316
In contrast to the cases in this Section that involved student offcampus online speech targeting teachers,317 the Fourth Circuit
examined a case involving student off-campus online speech that
attacked a classmate. In Kowalski, the court decided that a
Myspace page on which the student speaker opened up for
discussion unfounded rumors of another student’s sexual history318
was a “hate website”319 “created for the purpose of inviting others
to indulge in disruptive and hateful conduct which caused an inschool disruption.”320 The court determined that the “targeted,
defamatory nature of [the speech], aimed at a fellow classmate”
created an “‘actual or nascent’ substantial disruption in the
school,”321 and that “because [the] speech interfered with the work
and discipline of the school,” the speaker’s First Amendment rights
were not violated when she was punished for her speech.322 In its
decision, the court indicated that schools “have a duty to protect
their students from harassment and bullying in the school
environment,”323 and further reasoned that unlike a situation in
which “school authorities ‘suppress speech on political and social
issues based on disagreement with the viewpoint expressed,’
school administrators must be able to prevent and punish

315

Id. at 925.
Id. at 930.
317
See generally id.; Sagehorn v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 122 F. Supp. 3d 842 (D.
Minn. 2015).
318
See supra notes 273–80 and accompanying text.
319
Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 568 (4th Cir. 2011).
320
Id. at 567 (citations omitted).
321
Id. at 574 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508,
513 (1969)).
322
Id. at 574.
323
Id. at 572 (Alito, J., concurring) (stipulating in full that, “just as schools have a
responsibility to provide a safe environment for students free from messages advocating
illegal drug use, schools have a duty to protect their students from harassment and
bullying in the school environment.” (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007))).
316
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harassment and bullying in order to provide a safe school
environment conducive to learning.”324
Because educators must be able to maintain a safe environment
for their students not only psychologically but also physically,
speech that violently or threateningly targets specific teachers,
students, or the school community as a whole is largely punishable
by school authorities.325
3. Privacy or Publicity of Post
The standard governing school regulation of off-campus online
student speech is in part so pliable because similar posts can have
different meanings/effects based on the platform to which the
student posts the content and the privacy settings the speaker
chooses for her post, in addition to the nature and subject of the
post as discussed above.326 Many courts that have addressed the
issue have not analyzed the social media platform to which the
student speaker posted online from off campus, and whether a post
reaches the school community is not necessarily demonstrative of
its causing a substantial disruption at school.327 However, some
courts have considered the privacy settings or lack thereof these
student speakers chose for the posts in question as a factor of a
reasonable forecast of substantial disruption of the school
environment.328
When the Third Circuit decided in Synder329 that the fake
Myspace profile of a school principal the student posted was not

324

Id.
See supra Section II.C.1.a (discussing violent/threatening speech). This analysis is to
a great extent inextricable from the analysis of violent/threatening speech discussed supra
Section II.C.1.a, and is therefore not discussed at length in this Section, but is an
important consideration of courts examining the subject of a student’s online post.
326
See supra Sections II.C.1–II.C.2.
327
See Sagehorn v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 122 F. Supp. 3d 842, 857 (D. Minn.
2015) (noting, “[t]he fact that a statement may have been reasonably calculated to reach a
school audience is not sufficient: school officials must also show that the statements
posed a substantial disruptive effect.” (citing R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch.
Dist., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1140 (D. Minn. 2012))).
328
See discussion infra Section II.C.3.
329
See supra notes 284–93 and accompanying text.
325
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reasonably forecast as substantially disruptive,330 it considered the
steps that the speaker took to make the Myspace page available
only to a limited audience.331 The court weighed the fact that the
speaker’s post was at first viewable “in full by anyone who knew
the URL (or address) or who otherwise found the profile by
searching MySpace for a term it contained,”332 against the fact that
the day after the page’s creation, the speaker “made the profile
‘private’ after several students approached her at school, generally
to say that they thought the profile was funny.”333 The court
reasoned that these actions evidenced that the speaker “did not
even intend for the speech to reach the school—in fact, she took
specific steps to make the profile ‘private’ so that only her friends
could access it,” and further, that “the fact that her friends happen
to be [students of the same school] is not surprising, and does not
mean that [her] speech targeted the school.”334
While the Snyder court focused on how many people were
excluded from the Myspace page targeting a principal, the
Kowalski court emphasized the communal nature of a Myspace
page attacking a student. The Fourth Circuit found in Kowalski335
that a student-created Myspace page that “functioned as a platform
for [the speaker] and her friends to direct verbal attacks towards [a]
classmate”336 was reasonably forecast as substantially
disruptive.337 The creator of the page invited approximately one
hundred of her Myspace “friends”338 to access the page, which
allowed them to “respond to text, comments, and photographs in
an interactive fashion,” and eventually more than two dozen of her
classmates did so.339 The students involved with the Myspace page
likely knew their speech would not be kept private, as the Court
330

J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 925 (3d Cir. 2011).
Id. at 921.
332
Id.
333
Id.
334
Id. at 930–31.
335
See supra notes 273–80 and accompanying text; see also notes 319–25 and
accompanying text.
336
Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 572–73 (4th Cir. 2011).
337
Id. at 574.
338 See supra note 30 (explaining what it means to be a “friend” or “follower” of
someone on social media).
339
Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 567.
331
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noted that one student remarked, “wait til [the target of the speech]
sees the page lol.”340 Given that both the participants in and the
target of the page were students of the same high school,341 the
Court found it foreseeable that this “hate website”342 would reach
the school community “via computers, smartphones, and other
electronic devices”343 and “create a reasonably foreseeable
substantial disruption there.”344
The Second Circuit has similarly found that the publicity of a
post can factor into a reasonable forecast of substantial disruption
of the school.345 In Wisniewski,346 the court examined a post that
threatened a teacher and that was visible to fifteen of the speaker’s
friends, some of whom were also his classmates, for three
weeks,347 and ultimately determined that such “excessive
distribution” contributed to the reasonable foreseeability, if not
inevitability, of the post causing substantial disruption in the
school.348
Some courts consider not only the size of the speaker’s
audience in this regard, but also whether the speaker purposely
directed his speech at the school when determining whether a
forecast of substantial disruption was reasonable or if a disruption
occurred. In deciding that a student’s rap recording that threatened
teachers disrupted the school environment,349 the Fifth Circuit
noted that the speech in Bell350 “pertained directly to events
occurring at school,”351 and that the speaker “admitted he intended
the speech to be public and reach members of the school
340

Id. at 573. Note that “lol” is Internet shorthand for “laugh[ing] out loud.” Id. at 568.
Id. at 573, 574, 576–77.
342
Id. at 568.
343
Id. at 574.
344
Id.
345
Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.
2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1296 (2008); see also Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50
(2d Cir. 2008).
346
See supra notes 205–11 and accompanying text.
347
Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36.
348
Id. at 39–40.
349
Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 399–400 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied,
136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016).
350
See supra notes 236–45 and accompanying text.
351
Bell, 799 F.3d at 398.
341
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community, which is further evidenced by his posting the
recording to Facebook and YouTube.”352 Likewise, the Second
Circuit considered the fact that a speaker’s blog post was
“purposely designed by [the speaker] to come onto the campus,”353
that the post “directly pertained to events at [the high school],” and
that the speaker’s “intent in writing it was specifically to encourage
her fellow students to read and respond”354 when it decided that a
student’s blog post was foreseeably substantially disruptive of the
school environment.355
In summary, though the First Amendment guarantees free
speech to American citizens, this right is not absolute, and is
qualified in limited circumstances by legitimate government
interests in speech restriction.356 Consequently, the Supreme Court
has found that a school may regulate student speech that is (1)
foreseeably or actually substantially disruptive of the school
environment or that invades the rights of others,357 (2) offensive,
indecent, or lewd,358 (3) of pedagogical concern,359 or (4) promotes
the use of illegal drugs, even if the speech occurs off campus in a
school-sponsored activity.360
The standard governing off-campus online student speech,
however, is less straight-forward. Because no two student posts or
the circumstances surrounding the posts are exactly alike, and
because it is not definitively established that Tinker and its
progeny361 apply to these cases in the first place,362 there are many
352

Id. at 399.
Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008).
354
Id. at 50 (internal citations omitted).
355
Id. at 53.
356
See discussion supra Section I.A.
357
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
358
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
359
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
360
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007); see also discussion supra Section
II.B (examining the Tinker standard and its progeny (Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse,
respectively)).
361
See, Morse, 551 U.S. 393; Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 260; Fraser, 474 U.S. 814.
362
See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 393 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied,
136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016) (explaining that “of the six circuits to have addressed whether
Tinker applies to off-campus speech, five . . . have held it does. (For the other of the six
circuits (the third circuit), there is an intra-circuit split . . . ) . . . [t]he remainder of the
353
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factors to consider in determining whether a student’s off-campus
online speech could foreseeably cause or actually did cause a
substantial disruption of the school environment. It may seem that
courts vary widely in their considerations,363 however, their
evaluations are more easily compared by organizing them into
analytical categories based the nature of the speech, the subject of
the speech, and the privacy of the speech as discussed above in this
Part. Tinker’s complicated application to these cases may have
made sense at one time, but no longer accommodates the realities
of the current nature, use, and presence of the internet in daily
American life.
III. IS STUDENT SPEECH SUFFICIENTLY FREE?
A. School Regulation of Student Speech Allows Educators to
Shape Adolescent Understanding of Appropriate Behavior
Some opponents of the jurisprudence surrounding Tinker’s
application to off-campus online student speech argue not
necessarily that Tinker is the wrong standard, but rather that
schools should have no ability to control student speech that occurs
outside of the school environment.364 But to limit a school’s ability
to regulate student speech based on the physical boundaries of the
schoolyard would be to ignore the “somewhat ‘everywhere at
once’ nature of the internet”365 and the realities of our hyperconnected digital world.
Even before the internet allowed for easy communication
between individuals or to immeasurable audiences at all times of
circuits . . . do not appear to have addressed this issue.”) The Supreme Court of the
United States denied certiorari to Bell in 2016. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 136 S. Ct.
1166 (2016)).
363
See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
364
E.g., J.S. ex rel. Synder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 936–40 (3d Cir.
2011) (Smith, J., concurring) (arguing that Tinker should not apply to off-campus speech,
as “the First Amendment protects students engaging in off-campus speech to the same
extent it protects speech by citizens in the community at large,” and that applying Tinker
to off-campus speech “would empower schools to regulate students’ expressive activity
no matter where it takes place, when it occurs, or what subject matter it involves—so
long as it causes a substantial disruption at school.”).
365
Id. at 940 (Smith, J., concurring).
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day and night, the Supreme Court had “clearly stated that the rights
of free speech and assembly ‘do not mean that everyone with
opinions or beliefs to express may address a group at any public
place at any time.’”366 In truth, no person carries with him into a
Church, or a Synagogue, for example, or into “the United States
Senate or House, or into the Supreme Court, or any other court, a
complete constitutional right to go into those places contrary to
their rules and speak his mind on any subject he pleases.”367 It
follows that a student has no absolute right to contravene school
rules with his speech at school. The question is, then, whether a
school should be able to extend its control over a student to his offcampus online speech.
Though students and teachers do not “shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate,”368 the Supreme Court recognizes the need for
“comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials,
consistent with fundamental conditional safeguards, to prescribe
and control conduct in the schools.”369 This is a difficult, though
absolutely necessary, balance to strike, and one that is only
complicated by our increasingly-interconnected world. The courts
that have addressed this issue do not all agree as to what sort of
off-campus online speech is reasonably foreseen to be or is
actually disruptive of the school environment,370 but those that
have applied Tinker to the speech at issue371 have correctly
determined that a school must have some role to play in the
regulation of off-campus online student speech.
Usually, “when the ‘First Amendment is implicated, the tie
goes to the speaker.’”372 However, because “the relationship
366

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 517 (1969) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965)).
367
Id. at 521–22 (Black, J., dissenting).
368
Id. at 506; see also discussion supra Sections II.A–II.B.
369
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507.
370
See generally supra Part II.
371
See supra note 363 and accompanying text.
372
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 445 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Fed.
Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 474 (2007)). In the original
Wisconsin Right to Life opinion, the full sentence reads, “Where the First Amendment is
implicated, the tie goes to the speaker, not the censor.” 551 U.S. at 474.
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between schools and students ‘is custodial and tutelary, permitting
a degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised
over free adults,’ it might well be appropriate to tolerate some
targeted viewpoint discrimination in th[e] unique setting [of the
school].”373 School officials stand in loco parentis374 when
students are entrusted to their care, and courts have therefore
“upheld the right of schools to discipline students, to enforce rules,
and to maintain order.”375 Like parents, school officials, “knowing
that adolescents often test the boundaries of acceptable behavior,
may believe it is important (for the offending student and his
classmates) to establish when a student has gone too far.”376
Authority figures like parents and teachers have always determined
what sort of conduct is appropriate for children because, in many
ways, adults help guide children through situations that they are
not yet equipped to navigate themselves. As Justice Black noted,
“taxpayers send children to school on the premise that at their age
they need to learn, not teach.”377 Though their voices should be
heard, schoolchildren are not necessarily ready to decide for
themselves what sort of behavior is appropriate in a given setting.
Regulating student online speech is not akin to prior restraint, but
rather helps students learn “the boundaries of acceptable
behavior”378 from their mistakes.

373

Morse, 551 U.S. at 439 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995) (citation omitted)).
374
Meaning, “in the place of a parent.” In loco parentis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY,
(5th ed. 2016). See generally Morse, 551 U.S. at 413–22 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(discussing the doctrine of in loco parentis in the context of the history of American
public schools). But see id. at 424 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that “most parents,
realistically, have no choice but to send their children to a public school and little ability
to influence what occurs in the school. It is therefore wrong to treat public school
officials, for purposes relevant to the First Amendment, as if they were private,
nongovernmental actors standing in loco parentis.”).
375
Morse, 551 U.S. at 413 (Thomas, J., concurring).
376
Id. at 427 (Breyer, J., concurring).
377
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 522 (1969) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
378
Morse, 551 U.S. at 427 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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B. But a Determination of Whether Speech Is Appropriate Cannot
Depend Solely on the Reactions of the Listeners
While schools must have some ability to regulate off-campus
online student speech,379 the courts to have addressed the issue380
have erred in applying Tinker to such speech. Not only is the
Tinker substantial disruption assessment the incorrect standard by
which to evaluate whether off-campus online student speech
requires a school’s intervention, but it also should not apply to this
speech because courts cannot agree on how to consistently apply
it.381
The Tinker substantial disruption standard should not govern
off-campus online student speech because whether a school can
regulate a student’s post should not be based on the likelihood that
the post will cause or actually does cause a substantial disruption
of the school environment. To begin, the school environment is not
necessarily at its base level disturbance-free. Even “[a]dults often
say things that give rise to disruptions in public schools. Those
who championed desegregation in the 1950s and 60s caused more
than a minor disturbance in the southern schools.”382 If a classroom
is to be the “marketplace of ideas”383 that we cherish as Americans,
we cannot attempt to snuff out discussions of uncomfortable social
and political issues under the guise of necessarily quelling
disturbance of the school environment.
What’s more, “absence of evidence [of disturbance] is not
evidence of absence [of disturbance].”384 The Tinker Court held
that because the speakers “neither interrupted school activities nor
sought to intrude in the school affairs or the lives of others,” the
school could not constitutionally punish their speech.385 However,
379

See supra Section III.A.
See supra note 363 and accompanying text.
381
See discussion supra Section II.C (examining the current standard (or lack thereof)
governing school regulation of student speech posted online from off campus).
382
J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 940 (3d Cir. 2011)
(Smith, J., concurring).
383
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969).
384
See Fred Shapiro, The Absence of Proof, FREAKANOMICS (Sept. 29, 2011),
http://freakonomics.com/2011/09/29/the-absence-of-proof/
[https://perma.cc/9SCW3ZS4].
385
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
380
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in truth, “even a casual reading of the record shows that this
armband did divert students’ minds from their regular lessons,”
and that even if the school environment was not substantially
disrupted, “the record overwhelmingly shows that the armbands
did exactly what the [school] foresaw they would, that is, took the
students’ minds off their classwork and diverted them to thoughts
about the highly emotional subject of the Vietnam war.”386 This
Note does not argue that Tinker was wrongly decided, but rather
highlights the actual disturbance that resulted from the speech in
Tinker to emphasize that a lack of substantial disruption does not
equate to a serene learning environment. The Tinker standard,
therefore, is not infallible.
In allowing a substantial disruption, or lack thereof, to dictate
whether a school can punish a student’s off-campus online speech,
courts fail to address conduct that significantly disrupts the school
environment of at least one student, if not of the student body en
masse. It cannot be said that the free speech rights of one child
outweigh another child’s need for a safe learning environment, as
school officials often intervene in student conflicts at school. In
fact, the Tinker majority decreed that student conduct “in class or
out of it, which for any reason—whether it stems from time, place,
or type of behavior—materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course,
not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech.”387 Though the Court explicitly recognized the “rights of
other students to be secure and to be let alone,”388 this prong of the
Tinker standard is perplexingly largely overlooked by lower courts
and seldom cited to justify the regulation of off-campus online
student speech.389

386

Id. at 518 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Snyder, 650 F.3d at 946 (Fisher, J.,
dissenting) (noting that “[t]he majority also overlooks the substantial disruptions to the
classroom environment that follow from personal and harmful attacks on educators and
school officials.”).
387
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (emphasis added).
388
Id. at 508.
389
See generally supra Section II.C (discussing the current standard (or lack thereof)
governing school regulation of student speech posted online from off campus).
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If school officials could not regulate student speech that
disrupted a few other students’ learning environments but caused
no substantial disruption of the school, it would be challenging for
school officials to regulate bullying in their halls. There is
disagreement as to whether a school or a parent can best handle
punishment of cyberbullying.390 Yet, as an employee can complain
of harassment or a hostile work environment to the human
resources department of his company, so too should a student be
able to lodge similar complaints to the authority common to both
the student and his harasser: the school.391 A victim of
cyberbullying should not suffer in silence because the bully’s offcampus online speech was not sufficiently disruptive of the school
environment for the school to intervene.392 A court should instead
be able to find that a school is authorized to punish cyberbullying
as conflicting with the rights of other students to be let alone.393

390

Although definitions vary, “cyber harassment is often understood to involve the
intentional infliction of substantial emotional distress accomplished by online speech that
is persistent enough to amount to a ‘course of conduct’ rather than an isolated incident.”
CITRON, supra note 38, at 3. Cyber harassment or bullying may also involve “threats of
violence, privacy invasions, reputation-harming lies, calls for strangers to physically
harm victims, and technological attacks.” Id.
391
See Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011) (explaining
“as the [speaker] could anticipate, [the target of the off-campus online student speech]
and her parents took the attack as having been made in the school context, as they went to
the high school to lodge their complaint.”).
392
Note: regardless of a school’s ability to punish certain off-campus online student
speech, “[s]chools are increasingly involved in helping parents and students learn about
online safety. Some school districts have adopted cyber bullying curricula to obtain
federal funds earmarked for technology or to comply with state laws requiring ‘character
education’ in public schools. Their impetus has ethical roots as well. As the Supreme
Court has underscored, schools nurture the ‘habits and manners of civility as values in
themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of selfgovernment.’” CITRON, supra note 38, at 248 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986)).
393
In Kowalski, the student who was the target of the off-campus online speech
reported the harassment to the school (Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573), then “left the school
with her parents, as she did not want to attend classes that day, feeling uncomfortable
about sitting in class with students who had posted comments about her on the MySpace
webpage [at issue].” Id. at 568. Though this post clearly “colli[ded] with the rights of
[this student] to be secure and to be let alone,” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508, the court
mystifyingly concluded “that the school was authorized to discipline [the speaker]
because her speech interfered with the work and discipline of the school,” Kowalski, 652
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Though it is possible a cyberbully might be punished under the
Tinker substantial disruption standard,394 courts have been unable
to agree on what sort of cyber speech is substantially disruptive. As
discussed in Part II, online student speech, as any other sort of
speech, varies greatly by chosen platform,395 topic, and audience.
These variables, coupled with the lack of clarity surrounding
Tinker’s applicability to off-campus online speech in the first
place, leave schools to consider a great many factors and exercise a
great deal of discretion in deciding whether to punish a student’s
off-campus online speech.396
Courts examine broad categories of similar factors, as
organized and discussed in Part II of this Note, but do not
necessarily each examine the exact same factors in every case.
That courts do not agree on what sort of speech will be reasonably
forecast as or actually disruptive of the school environment397
when examining the speech at issue in these broad analytical
categories indicates that the deciding legal test is impossibly
subjective. So much of the standard lies within the judges’
discretion that a student speaker cannot be certain of just what sort
of off-campus online speech will subject him to constitutional
school punishment, save for perhaps the certainty that violent
and/or threatening speech seems to be somewhat more consistently
regulated than other speech examined.398 A student cannot know
with any certainty whether his school can generally regulate his
off-campus online speech, and thus might find that his best course
of action is to refrain from speaking at all.399 This standard,
F.3d at 574, and did not address the rights-of-students-to-be-let-alone prong of the Tinker
standard.
394
See supra note 394 and accompanying text.
395
It is worth noting that though chosen platform might seem to be its own category of
evaluation for courts, this should not be the case, or a student could possibly be punished
for posting something on Instagram, e.g., but not for posting the same thing on Twitter or
Snapchat.
396
See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 398 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied,
136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016).
397
See generally supra Part II.
398
See generally supra Section II.C.
399
The Vagueness Doctrine is a constitutional principle that requires “fair notice of
what is punishable and what is not . . . [to] prevent arbitrary enforcement of the laws.”
Wex Legal Dictionary & Encyclopedia, Vagueness Doctrine, LEGAL INFORMATION
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therefore, effectively chills off-campus online student speech and
silences young American speakers.
While it is “a myth to say that any person has a constitutional
right to say what he pleases, where he pleases, and when he
pleases,”400 it is also true that “[w]hen First Amendment rights are
at stake, a rule that ‘sweep[s] in a great variety of conduct under a
general and indefinite characterization’ may not leave ‘too wide a
discretion in its application,’”401 as the Tinker standard does when
applied to off-campus online student speech. Though Tinker in its
original application remains good law, the vagueness of this rule as
adapted and applied to modern off-campus online student speech
simply cannot pass constitutional muster, because “our
jurisprudence now says that students have a right to speak in
schools except when they do not.”402
Justice Clarence Thomas believes that Tinker itself is
unconstitutional403 because in his view, “the history of public
education suggests that the First Amendment, as originally
understood, does not protect student speech in public schools.”404
This fundamentally cannot be the case, for while “the original idea
of schools . . . was that children had not yet reached the point of
experience and wisdom which enabled them to teach all of their
elders,”405 it is also generally accepted that “the Nation has
outworn the old-fashioned slogan that ‘children are to be seen not

INSTITUTE,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/vagueness_doctrine
[https://perma.cc
/KTQ4-3V8E] (last visited Nov. 6, 2018). A statute is “also void for vagueness if a
legislature’s delegation of authority to judges and/or administrators is so extensive that it
would lead to arbitrary prosecutions.” Id. Though generally applied towards criminal
laws, the principles of the vagueness doctrine are just as relevant to the issue of school
punishment of off-campus online student speech.
400
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 522 (1969) (Black, J.,
dissenting); see also supra Section II.A.
401
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 440–41 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940)).
402
Id. at 418 (Thomas, J., concurring).
403
Id. at 410.
404
Id. at 410–11. Thomas also observes that “[t]he Tinker Court made little attempt to
ground its holding in the history of education or in the original understanding of the First
Amendment,” Id. at 420, and argues that Tinker itself has no basis in the Constitution. Id.
at 410–22.
405
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting).
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heard.’”406 Today, “public school conveys to our young the
information and tools required not merely to survive in, but to
contribute to, civilized society.”407 To be sure, “[s]chool discipline,
like parental discipline, is an integral and important part of training
our children to be good citizens—to be better citizens.”408 To
silence children absolutely cannot possibly be the best way to
prepare them to become contributing members of civilized society.
It is therefore necessary not only to maintain the First
Amendment’s general application to student speech in public
school settings, but also to recognize that the First Amendment
rights of a public-school student are subject to limitation, and in so
doing protect a school’s tutelary role in a student’s life.
The four main authorities governing the regulation of student
speech on school grounds or in school-sponsored activities are
well-established law.409 Though times have noticeably changed in
the years since these cases were decided, this Note does not
challenge the general applicability of this precedent to cases of inschool or school-sponsored student speech today. Rather, this Note
disputes that Tinker and its progeny can or should be applied,
unmodified, to cases of off-campus online student speech that arise
in the context of our interconnected, social-media-obsessed world
today. Courts have correctly recognized a school’s need to be able
to control its environment in painstakingly applying Tinker to offcampus online student speech.410 However, because the Tinker
standard does not accurately encompass the realities of the internet
and its place in an American student’s life, courts inadvertently
conduct haphazard Tinker analyses in off-campus online student
speech cases that result in unpredictable outcomes. Consequently,
Tinker must be replaced as the governing standard in these cases.

406

Id.
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 278 (1988).
408
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 524 (Black, J., dissenting).
409
See supra Sections II.A–II.B, discussing First Amendment caselaw generally, and
Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse.
410
See supra Sections II.A–II.C.
407
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IV. INSTEAD, TINKER WITH TINKER
Tinker cannot be the standard governing a school’s ability to
punish off-campus online student speech because it is too
inconsistently applied. Instead, this Note advocates for a solution
that leads to more predictable outcomes and proposes that the
standard governing these cases should be a modified version of the
Tinker test. Student speech that is posted online from off campus
should be subject to punishment by school officials if that speech
(1) touches and concerns the school community or a member of the
school community, and if that speech (2) interferes with the rights
of members of the school community “to be secure and to be let
alone.”411 This is a two-pronged test, meaning that both elements
of the test must be met if the student is to be constitutionally
punished by the school for her off-campus online speech.
Therefore, if the off-campus online speech in question does not
touch and concern the school, school officials cannot punish the
student for that speech. Likewise, even if the off-campus online
speech touches and concerns the school, if it does not interfere
with the rights of other members of the school community to be
secure and let alone, the school cannot punish that speech.
The idea that speech should touch and concern the school to
come under the school’s jurisdiction springs from the property law
principal that a covenant should touch and concern the benefitted
or burdened land. In property law, a covenant touches and
concerns the land if executing that covenant affects what happens
on the land at issue.412 In the same vein, student speech would
touch and concern the school if that speech affects what happens at
school. The school could use the three broad analytical categories
discussed in Part II to determine whether the student’s off-campus
online speech touches and concerns the school. That is, the school
could consider the (1) nature of the post, (2) subject of the post,
and (3) audience of the post in making this decision. If in
evaluating these three aspects of the post the school determines
411

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
Alan R. Romero, Deciding Whether a Covenant Touches and Concerns the Land,
DUMMIES,
http://www.dummies.com/education/law/deciding-whether-a-covenanttouches-and-concerns-the-relevant-land/ [https://perma.cc/RPE6-BH8B] (last visited
Nov. 6, 2018).
412
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that the post touches and concerns the school, the post would fall
under the school’s jurisdiction, and the school could then punish
the speaker as if the speech had occurred at school if the school
also finds that the speech interfered with the rights of others to be
secure and let alone. No one of these three analytical categories
would be determinative; rather, the schools would weigh all of the
criteria considered in its evaluation. The schools would not be
weighing these factors to determine whether the speech caused a
reasonable forecast of or actual disturbance, as is the current
practice, but rather weigh the factors to determine whether the
speech touches and concerns the school community in the first
place.
Further, the “general right of the individual to be let alone,” is
much “like the right not to be assaulted or beaten, the right not to
be imprisoned, the right not to be maliciously prosecuted, [and] the
right not to be defamed.”413 Underlying each of these individual
rights is “in reality not the principle of private property, but that of
an inviolate personality.”414 That is, every man has a right to be
respected and secure in his person. This right may not be
trespassed upon by a student asserting his freedom of speech. The
standard that this Note proposes protects the rights of not only
other students to be let alone, but all members of the school
community, including faculty and staff. This ensures that a post
maliciously attacking a teacher or other school official, for
example, would not slip through the cracks because it did not
interfere with the rights of other students to be let alone.
Moreover, off-campus online speech that touches and concerns
the school community is not punishable simply because it also
breaks a school rule. Rather, that post must touch and concern the
school community and interfere with the rights of others to be let
alone for the school to constitutionally punish it. This distinction
allows the off-campus online student speech that is truly of the
school’s concern to fall under school authority, while
acknowledging that the speaker was not in a school setting when

413

Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
205 (1890).
414
Id.
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he spoke. To permit the school to punish, in all cases, the student
speaking online from off campus exactly as if she had spoken at
school would be to install an authoritarian regime that exercises
control over students in all places and at all times.415 Instead, the
proposed standard requires the student’s off-campus online speech
not only touch and concern the school community, but also
interfere with the rights of others to be let alone if the school is to
punish that speech to ensure that schools are only able to punish
speech that is truly of pedagogical concern.
To illustrate the nuances of the proposed standard, consider
this: if a student posted something online from off campus that
mocked a student from another school, the speaker’s school would
examine the nature, subject, and audience of the post, and likely
determine that the post did not touch and concern the school. The
speaker therefore could not be punished by his school for that post.
In contrast, if the speaker’s post mocked a classmate or teacher at
his own school, the school would likely determine that the post
touched and concerned the school, and the post would fall under
the school’s jurisdiction. If the school then found that the post
interfered with the rights of other members of the school
community to be let alone, the school could punish the speaker as
if he had spoken at school. If a student mocked a teacher by
discussing her personal life,416 for example, he could likely be
415
J.S. ex rel. Synder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 936–40 (3d Cir. 2011)
(Smith, J., concurring) (arguing that Tinker should not apply to off-campus speech, as
“the First Amendment protects students engaging in off-campus speech to the same
extent it protects speech by citizens in the community at large,” and that applying Tinker
to off-campus speech “would empower schools to regulate students’ expressive activity
no matter where it takes place, when it occurs, or what subject matter it involves—so
long as it causes a substantial disruption at school.”).
416
See generally Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d
Cir. 2011); Snyder, 650 F.3d at 930. Both cases involve fake Myspace profiles made of
principals, and are good examples of personal attacks on teachers that are not wellreasoned, legitimate protests of those principal’s policies or practices. This does not mean
to suggest that certain speech is more legitimate than others; rather, that certain speech is
appropriate to broadcast to a wide audience (e.g., speech protesting a school policy), and
certain speech should be subject to punishment in order to teach children the boundaries
of socially appropriate behavior. Mocking a teacher for no other reason than to do so
interferes with his right to be let alone personally, and is not a legitimate challenge to his
position as an authority figure (in which role he has less right to be let alone, because
authority figures generally should not go unchecked in our society).
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punished for violating her right to be let alone. But if that student
had spoken out against a teacher’s practice in an informed,
reasoned way, that student would likely not be punished, assuming
the school allows for the legitimate criticism of authority that is
essential to a functioning democracy.
This Note directs those who might take issue with any given
school punishment of an off-campus online student post to an idea
from Justice Harlan’s Tinker dissent. If the school can show that it
punished the post only after it found that the post both (1) touched
and concerned the school, and (2) interfered with the rights of
other members of the school community to be secure and let alone,
the student challenging the punishment would have “the burden of
showing that a particular school measure was motivated by other
than legitimate pedagogical concerns—for example, a desire to
prohibit the expression of an unpopular point of view, while
permitting expression of the dominant opinion.”417
Had the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School known of
Nikolas Cruz’s post indicating his intent to become “a professional
school shooter”418 before the events of that fateful February day,419
it might have applied this proposed standard to determine whether
to take action against Cruz. In so doing, the school would first
determine whether the post touched and concerned the school
community by evaluating the nature, subject, and audience of the
post. The post is clearly violent in nature, and reasonably
understood as directed towards the school the speaker attended.420
Additionally, the speaker made no attempts to conceal his message
as he posted it in the public comments of a YouTube video.421
Taking all three of these factors into consideration, the speaker’s
school could reasonably determine that his post falls into its
jurisdiction, and would thus apply the second prong of the
417
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 526 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
418
Apel, supra note 7.
419
Assuming he was still a student at this point. See supra notes 1–10 and
accompanying text.
420
Or previously attended. This analysis assumes he was still a student at Marjory
Stoneman Douglas High School at this point, which would be required for the school to
punish him.
421
Apel, supra note 7.
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proposed standard to his speech. The post interferes with the rights
of other students to be alone in that it is reasonably understood to
threaten the school community. Students are not free to learn in
peace if they have reason to fear for their lives while at school.
Because Cruz’s off-campus online post touches and concerns the
school community, it would fall within the school’s jurisdiction.
Additionally, the post interferes with the rights of other students
and faculty to be let alone at school by instilling fear, and would
therefore be subject to school punishment at the discretion of
school administrators.
In contrast, consider a Parkland shooting survivor’s
hypothetical Facebook post encouraging classmates to walk out of
class in support of gun reform under this Note’s proposed standard.
Suppose her post said “Walk out of class with me tomorrow to
demand gun reform and make our schools safer places to learn
#NationalSchoolWalkOut #MarchForOurLives #NeverAgain.”
Both the nature and the subject of her post are political, and as it
encourages peer political action at school, it is targeted at her
classmates. Assuming she has standard privacy settings on her
Facebook page, only those she has allowed to be her Facebook
“friends” can see her post.422 Many of these “friends” are likely
her classmates. Taking these factors together, this post touches and
concerns the school community, placing it within the school’s
jurisdiction, as if it had been said on campus itself. The post is
targeted at the student’s classmates generally but identifies no
individuals and is in no way disparaging to her classmates. The
school would therefore not be able to find that this post interfered
with the rights of any other students or faculty to be let alone, and

422

See Staci D. Kramer, I Tested Facebook's Default Privacy Settings. They're Worse
than Zuckerberg Says., SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Apr. 16, 2018, 1:13 PM),
https://www.smh.com.au/business/companies/i-tested-facebooks-default-privacysettings-theyre-worse-than-zuckerberg-says-20180414-p4z9m6.html
[https://perma.cc
/VTL2-34NQ]; Larry Magid, Facebook Changes New User Default Privacy Setting to
Friends Only--Adds Privacy Checkup, FORBES (May 22, 2014, 9:00
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/larrymagid/2014/05/22/facebook-changes-defaultprivacy-setting-for-new-users/#61ba7b9459ac [https://perma.cc/T5SC-5SFN].
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accordingly, the school could not punish this student for her offcampus online speech.423
The posts at issue in the Parkland example are perhaps more
clear than much of what schools generally encounter. Still, this
standard would hopefully lead to more consistent outcomes than
the current use of Tinker in cases of First Amendment issues
arising from school punishment of off-campus online student
speech. For example, if applied to the B.L. v. Mahanoy Area Sch.
Dist. case that is pending in the Middle District of Pennsylvania,424
the outcome would be more predictable than speculating as to what
a court may find to cause a substantial disruption of a school
environment.425 Mahanoy originated when a high school student,
B.L., was removed from the junior varsity cheerleading squad for
an image she sent to her friends via the social media application
Snapchat426 on the weekend,427 which depicted herself and a friend
brandishing their middle fingers at a convenience store.428 Text
that was superimposed on the photo read “fuck school fuck softball
fuck cheer fuck everything,”429 in contravention of a school rule
that forbids cheerleaders from posting “negative information”
about cheerleading on the internet. B.L. now challenges this school
rule under the First Amendment,430 and this Note now applies the
proposed standard to her speech.
The nature of B.L.’s post is not immediately obvious. It is
neither threatening nor violent. It is not political, and does not
appear to by satirical. If anything, it is meant to be funny, or at
423

Though the post might be disruptive of the school environment by encouraging the
speaker’s classmates to join her in walking out of class, substantial disruption is not a
factor in the standard this Note proposes.
424
B.L. v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., ACLU OF PA., https://www.aclupa.org/ourwork/legal/legaldocket/bl-v-mahanoy-area-sch-dist
[https://perma.cc/KH3X-AKMU]
(last visited Nov. 6, 2018).
425
As is required under the current Tinker standard. See discussion supra Part II.
426
The ACLU-PA explains, “Snapchat is a popular social media smartphone app that
allows users to post images that are accessible on the platform only for short periods of
time—ranging from one second to 24 hours—and are self-deleting.” ACLU OF PA., supra
note 424; see also Graber, supra note 6, for further explanation of Snapchat.
427
ACLU OF PA., supra note 424.
428
Id.
429
Id.
430
Id.
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least an expression of teenage angst to which her friends, the
recipients of the post, would surely relate. The subject of the post
is clearly the speaker’s school community, as she expresses
exasperation with not only the school itself, but also two athletic
teams that presumably represent the school. Her audience was
limited to her Snapchat “friends,” the majority of which are likely
her classmates.431 The combination of these factors indicates this
off-campus online post touches and concerns the school
community, and reasonably places it under the schools purview.
However, it does not seem that this post interferes with the rights
of other students to be let alone. The speaker names neither
classmates nor teammates, and includes no details that would lead
someone to interpret this post as threatening. One might argue that
the post interferes with the rights of the school, the softball team,
or the cheerleading squad to be left alone as entities, but to allow
this argument to prevail would be to swallow the rule and allow for
the suppression of many teenage opinions that rage against
authority or an establishment. B.L.’s speech might be distasteful,
and she may have violated a school rule by posting “negative
information” about cheerleading online,432 but as her post did not
interfere with the rights of others to be let alone, the school should
not be able to punish her for this off-campus online speech.
Because students posting online are not necessarily posting at
school, their posts should not automatically be punishable by
school authorities. However, there are off-campus online posts that
are relevant to the school, and therefore need to be addressed by
school officials. Though the requirement that the post touch and
concern a member of the school community may seem too broad,
the standard intends largely to cover those posts that purposely
target other students or teachers at the school.433 This proposed
standard does not at all attempt to stifle general communications
between students—schools exist to guide students through certain
431

Id.
Id.
433
See generally Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 573–76 (4th Cir.
2011) (discussing the nexus of the speech to the school, that the family of the victim
understood the attack to be in a school context, and that the school had an interest in
preventing “copy-cat” behavior).
432
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prescribed activities, and “among those activities is personal
intercommunication among the students. This is not only an
inevitable part of the process of attending school; it is also an
important part of the educational process.”434 Instead, this
proposed standard attempts to strike a reasonable, predictablyapplied balance between a student’s First Amendment rights
against the need for a school to maintain order in its halls.
CONCLUSION
The Tinker standard was crafted in an era before the internet
and social media revolutionized human interaction and
communication. Though this standard remains good law as applied
to in-school speech, it does not account for the realities of our
interconnected world, and its application to off-campus online
student speech therefore leads to unpredictable outcomes that serve
neither students nor educators well.435 Though the Supreme Court
has yet to address this issue,436 “[l]egal solutions need to be
implemented sooner rather than later. The longer we wait, the
harder it will be to transform conduct, attitudes, and behavior” on
the subject.437
Currently, a school can punish an off-campus online student
post if it is reasonably forecast to cause or actually does cause a
substantial disruption of the school environment.438 Instead, a
school should be able to punish only those off-campus online
student posts that (1) touch and concern the school community,
and (2) interfere with the rights of other students and faculty to be
secure and let alone. This proposed standard balances the need of a
school to regulate off-campus online student speech that is truly of
its concern, with the integrity of a student’s right to express herself
and make her voice heard. The yet uncharted waters of digital

434
435
436
437
438

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969).
See discussion supra Sections II.C, III.B.
See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
CITRON, supra note 38, at 28.
See supra Sections II.A–II.C.
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citizenship439 are tempestuous, but given the proper guidelines,
students and educators can navigate them safely together.

439

CITRON, supra note 38, at 194. “The Internet holds great promise for digital
citizenship, by which I mean the various ways online activities deepen civic engagement,
political and cultural participation, and public conversation.” Id. (emphasis in original).

